British Espionage In The United States

Summary

Covert Action against the United States is not new. From before the very beginning of this nation, foreign agents sought ways to gain advantages over the fledgling nation. The following examples of espionage took place in the earliest days of the United States by foreign agents.

In the first case, John Jay was at the eye of the storm. British, French, and the Spanish, all used espionage and covert action to influence all Americans but John Jay in particular. Foreign nationals understood John Jay’s influence transcended his native New York and sought ways to influence him. In most cases, instead of trying to influence Jay directly, foreign agents found it better and easier to use people around Jay as unwitting pawns. The following illustrates how John Jay’s actions changed as a result of their deeds, and how those activities seriously jeopardized the national security of the United States. 

In the second case, the British sought to discredit Secretary of State Randolph because he was in direct opposition to John Jay’s treaty with Great Britain. As George Washington wavered between ratifying the treaty or not, the British took covert action, and as a consequence, ruined the career of a truly honest and good man. 

In both cases, foreign agents of influence changed America’s course. In the first case, it severely weakened John Jay’s ability to bargain from a position of influence. In the second, it ruined a man’s political and private life and set American on a course of war with France.

The Jay Treaty

The British originally no reason to change or augment the 1783 Peace Treaty. Once the United States, under the Articles of Confederation, failed to comply with the treaty agreements, the British felt they held the high ground not upholding their own end of the bargain. However, while the Congress tried in good faith to uphold the peace treaty, the British did not, and simply used the Articles’ shortcomings as an excuse not to abide by the agreement. 

All that changed with the creation of the new constitutional government. Now, for the first time, the central government could enforce treaty obligations. Furthermore, outside influences from Europe encouraged the United States to join them in an “armed neutrality league.” The British were alarmed that the new league, in conjunction with French and Spanish forces on land and sea, might be enough to destroy their own superiority at sea. Therefore, they agreed to meet with the Americans to resolve the 1783 treaty issues. 

President George Washington and Secretary of State Randolph first considered sending Alexander Hamilton to negotiate the new treaty, but Hamilton noted his Federalist influences meant Republicans would not accept anything he came back with. So instead, Hamilton recommended sending John Jay in his place. Currently presiding as Chief Justice of the United States, Jay had plenty of experience, was not completely disliked by the Republicans, and was extremely sensitive to the mission’s importance of settling a dispute that might otherwise lead to war between the United States and Great Britain. "On May 12, a thousand New Yorkers cheered from the docks as Jay sailed to England, hoping to avert war." Republicans doubted Jays mission. “Madison had a nagging intuition that Jay would surrender too much to England and rupture Franco-American relations." Jay understood the treaty could ignite a firestorm and warned Hamilton, “We must not make a delusive settlement that would disunite our people and leave seeds of discord to germinate.” (485)

September 30,1794 Jay held the high ground on September 30, 1794, "in a draft submitted by him on that date." (136) Bemis, who wrote the monograph on Jay, found that draft in the London National Archives, but nowhere else. (136) That draft indicates, "A stupendous retreat by the American plenipotentiary," and, "It would have been a most embarrassing document for the Federalists, or for Jay individually, to have had submitted to the Senate. It is doubtful whether any person outside of the Foreign Office, except Jay, ever saw the document." (136) According to Bemis, the final draft, read side by side with the September 30 draft, leaves no doubt of the retreat. (136)

So why did Jay retreat from the high ground? Someone leaked a private letter from Secretary of State, Randolph to John Jay in the Aurora stating Randolph believed in the "immense value" of harmony between GB and the USA. Randolph claimed the treaty needed to be worked out to "prevent war and to preserve perfect neutrality." The news article "severely attacked Jay," and sensationally claimed Jay’s instructions were to agree to anything to prevent war, including selling the United States back to Great Britain if necessary.  (133)

September 13,1794, The first full account of the progress of negotiations is contained Jay’s letter to Randolph. (133) This letter contained drafts of a proposed treaty by Grenville and by Jay. 

September 20,1794, Hammond writing to Grenville stated Hamilton confidentially told Hammond, "with great seriousness and with every demonstration of sincerity . . . that . . . it was the settled policy of this Government in every contingency, even in that of an open contest with Great Britain, to avoid entangling itself with European connexions which could only tend to involve this country in dispute wherein it might have no possible interest, and commit it in a common cause with the allies, from whom, in the moment of danger, it could derive no succor." (Note: Succor is defined as assistance and support in times of hardship and distress) (137-138)

Thus assured that there was no longer any danger that America would join the Baltic powers in an armed neutrality league, Grenville had no difficulty in defeating Jay's proposals. “Jay, anxious to have some kind of treaty which to prevent war, retreated, and, as stated, signed the so-called Jay Treaty." (138)

November 12,1794, Randolph answered Jay’s letter about the Grenville draft. Unfortunately, the instructions did not arrive before Jay signed the Treaty.

November 19,1794, "On the day the treaty was signed [Jay] wrote to Ellsworth, Washington, Hamilton, King and Pinckney that the treaty was concluded and he thought we had reason to be satisfied; no further concessions could be obtained; if this treaty failed he despaired of another." (138) Therefore, “Jay, anxious to have some kind of treaty which to prevent war, retreated, and, as stated, signed the so-called Jay Treaty." (138)

(NOTE: This may explain why G. Washington later signed the document - Washington understood that if the Jay Treaty was not ratified, war could result. Furthermore, since the US was no longer willing to join the Baltic neutrality league, the US would be on its own against GB. France had already refused to allow the US envoy, Pinckney into France as the United States ambassador and had effectively closed relations with the United States.

December 15,1794, Randolph makes detailed criticisms of Grenville's proposals,"based on scanty information supplied earlier from Jay. (133) 

February 15,1794, Monroe to Randolph February 15, 1795, complaining the French had heard a treaty with GB had been signed in secrecy, that Jay had retreated from the US position, and that Jay refused to tell Monroe about the treaty or what had happened in London. (139)

May 30,1795 , Randolph to Monroe in France: Once the treaty finally arrived, Randolph wrote on May 30,1795 to Monroe that neither he nor Washington approved the Jay Treaty and asked Jay to explain parts of the treaty. (140) 

June 1,1795, Jay’s reply did not place the treaty in a better light. (Anderson 140) 

July 1,1795, The full text of the Jay Treaty was leaked by a Republican Senator. Madison claimed the effect was “like an electric velocity: imparted to every part of the union.” (487)

July 3,1795, Washington sent the Jay Treaty to Hamilton to evaluate.

The treaty's deficiencies were exaggerated in the partisan discussions of the time. It did prevent war for a period; granted East Indian trade; secured western ports; but secured no compensation for Negroes carried off after the Revolution; gave up the contention that free ships make free goods; ignored impressments, and left the subject of contraband unresolved. (141 - 142) The unresolved question of contraband meant the British continued to stop, search, and seize US ships heading to France." (142)

June 27,1795, Randolph wrote Washington stating the French Ambassador, Fauchet, asked that any US-B treaty be withheld from ratification until after Adet, the new French Ambassador arrived in Philadelphia.

June 29,1795, Washington refused to wait and instead, on June 29, submitted the Jay Treaty draft to the Senate, with Randolph's concerns about it. By doing so, the Senate discussed the treaty as it was written, complete with the noted problems. (142)

From this point, the Jay Treaty and the Randolph Case overlap and the best way to talk about one is to include the other:

June 30, 1795, The former French Minister, Fauchet, told Randolph that Jay's mission weakened the political bonds between France and the US. (143)  The new French Minister, Adet, agreed and explained in a letter, dated 30 June 1795, given to Randolph, that the Jay Treaty violated the US Treaty already in force in France because it included a list of contraband, articles formerly excluded in the treaty with France. The Jay Treaty also outlawed the arming of foreign ships in American Ports, something the French had been allowed by their treaty. After meeting with Adet, Randolph then wrote to Washington recommending the Jay Treaty not be ratified until after the provision listing contraband, that the French needed and wanted, be removed. (144)

July 2, 1795, Randolph wrote to all the minsters abroad warning them that he recommended the Jay Treaty not be ratified, and that it was unlikely Washington would sign the Jay Treaty until it returned from England with the article, and the British order for the seizing of provisions going to France removed. (148)

July 14,1795, Randolph to Monroe (in France): "The late British order for seizing provisions is a weighty obstacle to a ratification. I do not suppose that such an attempt to starve France will be countenanced." (147-148) (Countenanced: verb: admit as acceptable or possible). 

July 22,1795, Washington formally asked the Cabinet to submit their opinions about the Jay Treaty. Randolph wrote the Treaty should be ratified, but with the article concerning contraband omitted. (146)

July 24,1795, Washington, now at Mount Vernon gave permission for Randolph to write Hammond, the British minister, explaining Washington's position, that he "preferred to ratify the treaty rather than keep alive the seeds of discord," but that the British royal authority to seize US ship cargo on the way to France kept Washington from doing so. This was meant to help elevate the internal pressures of the treaty. However, for Randolph, the letter backfired. (146 -147).

July, 1794, Randolph’s response to The Whiskey Rebellion led the British to understand that G. Washington valued Randolph's opinion. (Randolph saw the rebellion as a danger because Hamilton wanted to use the rebellion as an excuse to raise a powerful standing army. Because Washington ultimately agreed with Randolph’s views, "Randolph represented the party of peace and the sending of commissioners was due to his influence over the mind of the President." (150)

July 26,1795, Mr. Hammond revealed a letter to Hamilton's successor, Oliver Wolcott, at a dinner to which he had invited the new Secretary of the Treasury. When questioned about how the letter came into the British hands, Hammond claimed the British Man of War Cerberus, captured the French corvette, Jean Bart, supposedly carrying this dispatch. A French officer had thrown the packet of papers overboard to keep it from falling into British hands. The packet, once retrieved, was sent to Lord Grenville, who then sent it to the British Minister, Mr. Hammond. (150-151)

July 27,1795: Hammond wrote to London. The Americans now had the intercepted letters. Hammond promised to make such use of them as would "be productive of the most beneficial effects to the general interests of His Majesty's service." (151) "The originals of the French letters are particularly interesting, and will, I am persuaded, if properly treated, tend to effect an essential change in the public sentiment of this country with regard to the character and principles of certain individuals, and to the real motives of their political conduct." (152)

July 28,1795, Hammond gave a copy of the "original letter" to Timothy Pickering, the Secretary of War. 

July 29,1795, Hammond and Pickering visit the Attorney-General, who then agreed that President Washington should be informed. Washington was then asked to return at once to the Capital.  

July 31,1795, Pickering letter to Washington said in part, "I confess I feel extreme solicitude, and, for special reason, which can be communicated to you only in person. . ." (149) It was enough to get Washington return to Philadelphia from Mount Vernon. He arrived on August 11. 

For the following week, George Washington tried to decide what to do. Finally, on August 19,1795, he called Randolph into his office. According to witnesses, Randolph read the statement and became enraged and indignant. He had no idea that the covert action had taken place and his immediate response was to leave George Washington. Randolph went to his office with a copy of the damming letter against him. That night, he formally resigned as Secretary of State.

On August 20,1795, Washington had no choice, and formally accepted Randolph’s resignation. The October 31, 1794 fabricated letter was just too powerful to overlook. From the time of his resignation Randolph's conduct was that of a desperate man, determined on one point only, his vindication. Randolph chased down Fauchet at Newport on his way home to France, and obtained from his a "certificate" emphatically asserting, 

"Mr. Randolph never received, either directly or indirectly, by himself or by another for his use, one shilling from myself or by my order, or according to my knowledge, here-say or belief, from any other public officer of France. I declare that he never made to me in this respect a single overture; and that no part of the above circumstance has the least relation to him personally. Although the explanation gives the occurrence referred to in his intercepted dispatches is difficult to comprehend, his explicit and emphatic assertions of Randolph's innocence, accompanied by Randolph’s own emphatic denials, should in the absence of any other evidence to the contrary be accepted, especially as the original account on which the charges are based is itself so confused and incomprehensible. Having gone carefully over the evidence again, I am of the decided opinion, that Randolph is not only not proved guilty but that Henry Cabot Lodge -- no great admirer of Randolph -- was right when he said "that the Secretary of State was corrupt, no one who knew him, as Jefferson said, for one moment believed. Whether he disposed of this charge or not, it was plain to his friends, as it is to posterity, that Randolph was a perfectly honorable man." (154-155)

"Randolph may have been voluble, imprudent, indecisive and unstable, but he was not dishonest, and there is no evidence that he betrayed his government or was more free in his discussions with foreign ministers than was unfortunately the custom of the day." (156)

Randolph ultimately published his elaborate Vindication, and then returned to Richmond. He returned to the practice of law and soon became a leading attorney and was senior counsel in Aaron Burr's defense. However, according to the law at the time, the Secretary of State was responsible for any funds for foreign relations, including any losses that might be sustained. After Randolph resigned, an audit found Randolph owed the United States $499,154.89. After two court cases, the amount still not payed in 1887, showed the Randolph estate now owed, with interest, a balance $61,355.07. There is no word on if the balance was ever paid off. Randolph died September 12, 1813.  (158-159)

In the end, the British covert action succeeded. It successfully thwarted Randolph’s opposition and influence over the Jay Treaty. Before the covert action, Randolph’s opposition had been enough to keep the Jay Treaty from being ratified. However after the action, public attention had been diverted away from the treaty’s inadequacies and towards the manufactured international incident. Then, George Washington had enough leeway to sign the document that favored the British, ratifying the treaty. Furthermore, the British covert action had one more ramification, it increased America’s leanings toward British commerce while increasing the distrust of France. For the British, it was the best of both worlds. For the French, it was nothing short of a formal military and commercial allegiance with their sworn enemy and the French nearly declared open war on the United States. 

As shown, covert action against the United States is not new. Foreign agents tried to influence American politics from the very beginning. The Jay Treaty and Randolph's discrediting are just two successful examples of espionage that took place in the earliest days of the United States by foreign agents of influence. These examples changed America’s influence and course for many years. In the first case, agents stopped America from bargaining from a position of strength and becoming strong enough to defend itself from foreign aggression, and in the second, it undermined the Office of the President to make a decision free from foreign influences. 

Final thoughts about why these two cases are still important: 

Today, covert action continues. Agents of Influence are often found in America's largest international corporations. As the heads of American businesses continue to put profits ahead of national security, covert actions will continue even as overt action become commonplace. America is now directly attacked or indirectly through Agents of Influence probably on a daily basis. Most people involved, as illustrated in the Randolph case, do not know they are being used as an agent of influence. False flag operations, in which one country claims to be another, is no longer the easiest way to influence Americans. Instead, countries like China are influencing America openly through commercial ventures. By concentrating on capitalistic and corporate greed, they have found American's primary weakness -- apathy. For many American's, national security no longer matters as long as there is a buck to be made. 

Bibliography:

Isaacson, Walter. Benjamin Franklin: An American Life. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2003, and Chernow, Ron. Alexander Hamilton. New York: Penguin Press, 2004

Isaacson, Walter. Benjamin Franklin: An American Life. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2003

Dice Robins Anderson, PH.D., LL.D. "Edmond Randolph: Secretary of State (January 2, 1794 - August 19, 1795)." In The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, edited by Samuel Flagg Bemis. New York: Alfrd A. Knopf, 1927.