The S.A.S. WWII POW Rescue

            The dreary sky of October 24, 1943, threatened to rain at any moment. British Special Air Service (S.A.S.) officers and men watched and listened from various hiding places along the Italian coastal road overlooking the beach. Every now and then, a German bicycle patrol rode by looking for signs of enemy activity before peddling off. Now, seven hours later, with the sun firmly set, Captain Power waited, straining to hear the sounds of boat engines he hoped would come.

            The former Allied Prisoners of War (POWs) arrived at the beach in groups of twos and threes shortly after dark. The S.A.S. security force assigned to the beach led the men to various hiding places in the bushes and trees behind Captain Power. They reminded the former prisoners to be quiet and to stay hidden because the German patrols in the area could show up at any moment. Eventually, over six hundred former prisoners hid in the bushes waiting to make their escape. They were anxious and scared, and the darkness seemed to amplify every sound they made in the damp air. The low heavy clouds and moonless night sky made the night so dark that Captain Power found it difficult to see the waters edge, less than two hundred yards away.

            Captain Power checked his watch. Thirty minutes past midnight; it was time. He flashed the signal light and waited, but there was no response from out on the water. He waited the mandatory two minutes and tried again; still no response. On his third attempt, Power saw the answering flashing lights, but so did the former prisoners. Making all kinds of noise, the men behind Power started inching forward through the bushes. Power whispered as loud as he dared, “Keep still!” But suddenly, a shot gun exploded the darkness. Three pistol shots answered the call and everyone froze. No one knew for sure where the sounds came from. But then, less than a minute later, a burst from a German submachine gun caused more than six hundred former POWs to panic and run.^[1]

*  *  *

            Captain Power’s story was not unique. He was one of fifty-seven men and officers of the 2nd Special Air Service (S.A.S.) Detachment who tried to rescue more than six thousand Allied POWs trapped behind German lines during operation Begonia-Jonquil. Located in Southern Italy during the fall of 1943, the men and officers of Begonia-Jonquil saw their rescue attempt as a colossal failure. Every officer and several enlisted men wrote detailed accounts describing what they each did, and why they thought Begonia-Jonquil failed. By reviewing the Begonia-Jonquil documents and comparing their stories to other primary and secondary documents, it is now possible to get a better idea of what went wrong, why it went wrong, and why the mission, thought of as a failure at the time, can now be shown to be more of a success than any of the primary participants could have comprehended. Studying Operation Begonia-Jonquil is important because its study may keep future missions from failing, and demonstrates why a tactical failure may ultimately prove to be a strategic success.

            At the time, no one person had a clear understanding of what was happening in Southern Italy during the fall of 1943. However, since then, much has been written about World War II, the battle for Italy, and the POWs. Most secondary sources written about POWs in Italy discuss the events in Northern Italy and the Vatican City escape network.^[2] However, less has been written about other POWs in Southern Italy, and even less about Operation Begonia-Jonquil. Of the little that has been written, most references can be traced directly to Roy Farren’s S.A.S. memoir, Winged Dagger: Adventures on Special Service.^[3] Unfortunately, what Farren reported in his memoir does not agree with the historical record, probably because although Farren was a member of the S.A.S. in Italy during 1943, he did not take part in the rescue. Additionally Farren’s memoir did not state where he received the information. Therefore, it is likely Farren never received the official story, but rather probably heard about the mission from others. Furthermore, Farren’s version of the story has major flaws. For example, while Farren reported the rescuers were given radios, one of several major complaints written by the men who participated in Begonia-Jonquil was complete lack of radio communications, which they say, severely hampered the mission and was a major cause of the mission failure.^[4]

            Unfortunately, the memoir was taken as gospel by Malcolm Tudor, one of the few historians has worked in the area. Tudor wrote six books on Allied POWs experiences in Italy, repeating Roy Farren’s version of the story three times. While that would not necessarily be a problem, misinformation from both Farren and Tudor accounts, made it seem like Begonia-Jonquil failed for fairly straightforward and simple reasons. However, careful examination of the historical record reveals the failure of Operation Begonia-Jonquil was much more complicated than either the available secondary sources, or official documents, originally suggested.           

            At the time, no one person had a clear understanding of what was happening in Southern Italy during the fall of 1943. However, since then, much has been written about World War II and the events in Southern Europe. A great deal has been written about the battle for Italy.  A great deal has also been written about POWs and their attempted escapes. Although much has been written about Allied POWs escapes from Northern Italy to Switzerland and Southern Prisoners using the Vatican City escape network,^[5] and even more was written about the 1944 mass escape from the German Stalag Luft III and other camp escapes,^[6] little has been written about Begonia-Jonquil. Of what has been written, most references can be traced directly to Roy Farren’s S.A.S. memoir, Winged Dagger: Adventures on Special Service.^[7] Unfortunately, what Farren reported in his memoir does not agree with the historical record, probably because although Farren was a member of the S.A.S. in Italy during 1943, he did not take part in the rescue. Additionally Farren’s memoir did not state where he received the information. It is likely Farren never received the official story, but rather probably heard about the mission from others. However, Farren’s version of the story has major problems. For example, while Farren reported the rescuers were given radios, one of several major complaints written by the men who participated in Begonia-Jonquil was complete lack of radio communications, which severely hampered the mission and stated as a major cause of the mission failure.^[8]              

            Unfortunately, the memoir was taken as gospel by Malcolm Tudor, one of the few historians has worked in the area. Tudor wrote six books on Allied POWs experiences in Italy, repeating Roy Farren’s version of the story three times. While that would not necessarily be a problem, the misinformation from both Farren and Tudor made it seem like Begonia-Jonquil failed for fairly straightforward and simple reasons. However, careful examination of the historical record reveals the failure of Operation Begonia-Jonquil was much more complicated than either the available secondary sources, or official documents, originally suggested.

            Operation Begonia-Jonquil was a combined air-sea attempted rescue of more than 6,000 Allied former Prisoners of War (POWs) trapped behind the German Gustav Line in Southern Italy in 1943.  Using the Special Air Service (S.A.S.), its lofty goal was shaped by the German Army’s attempt to retake Italy after its surrender to the Allied forces on September 8th, 1943. The Begonia-Jonquil master plan involved S.A.S. members parachuting in behind the Gustav Line, finding and directing Allied POWs to beaches along the eastern coast of Italy, and using Italian fishing boats to transport the POWs to Allied held territory.^[9] The plan seemed simple enough, but close analysis of available records shows that the mission was designed using flawed intelligence and assumptions that proved almost insurmountable. Additionally, formally secret Ultra records prove the Germans knew about the rescue attempt almost immediately.^[10] That meant there was almost certainly a German spy working alongside mission planners. Worse yet, the POWs lack of military bearing made rescue unlikely because many did not want to be rescued, preferring to wait out the war in relative comfort hidden on Italian farms. Lastly, security regulations that compartmentalized mission objectives kept Begonia-Jonquil mission planners unaware of other ongoing missions in Italy. Taken together, these unforeseen complications compromised the rescue attempt in too many ways for it to succeed.

            As part of the Italian government’s conditional surrender on September 8th, 1943, it agreed to immediately repatriate all Allied POWs.^[11] However, while Italy repatriated the POWs in the extreme south, the repatriation of POWs behind the 1943 German Gustav Line was not possible. Instead, the best the Italian government could do was give Allied POWs ten days worth of food and supplies, open the camp gates, and tell the Allied POWs to fend for themselves.^[12] 

            Also known as the German Winter Line, the Gustav Line’s defensive fortifications, “centered on the town of Cassino with its 1,700 feet high peak topped a sixth-century monastery, its deep underground bunkers, labyrinthine tunnels, machine gun emplacements, antitank ditches, minefields, and barbed wire were to be the stuff of an attacker’s nightmare.”^[13] It eventually stretched across the Italian peninsula from the Tyrrhenian Sea on the West coast, to the Adriatic Sea.^[14] The Gustav Line proved extremely difficult for the British to penetrate and was not broken until May 16th, 1944.^[15] The difficulty prompted the British to attempt several different strategies to break through, and some endangered the POWs trying to evade the Germans. Ultimately, General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander for the European Theatre, agreed that if the Gustav line could not be penetrated, its secondary goal should be to force the Germans to use an exorbitant amount of troops and supplies to keep Italy. In that way, less German material and men would be available for the defense of France during and after the D-day invasion, originally planned for the following spring.^[16] 

            Set against that strategic background, in 1943, members of the POW office in London, located overlooking Piccadilly Circus, several blocks from the London War Office, grew increasingly concerned about the relative safety of Allied POWs in Italy. Although the Italians had provided each POW new uniforms, and ten days rations of food after the official Italian surrender, further communications revealed many northern Italy camp commanders, fearing the Germans would soon retake the camp, literally told their Allied POWs in the North to walk to Switzerland. Additionally, because camps in the South were too far away from Switzerland to make a mass escape north possible, southern Italian camp commanders told their POWs to head South, and either sneak through the Gustav Line or into port towns, where Italian fishing boats might transport them to Allied held territory. Other evading POW options included hiding out on farms until the Allied army overran their positions, or to seek asylum in the Vatican City. Since Italy was a peninsula, the only other POWs option in the South was to wait in POW camps for the Germans to arrive to take them custody. Additionally, for those POWs too sick or injured to move, once the Germans arrived, the Germans continued to either care for the POWs in place, sent them to guarded hospitals in Germany, or repatriated them under the rules of the Geneva Convention.^[17] Although many of the Italian POW camps did release their POWs, not all did before the German army arrived. In those camps, the Germans loaded the POWs onto railway cars and transported them to Germany to places like Stalag Luft III, the sight of the now famous mass escape that ended with Hitler ordering the execution of fifty POWs.^[18]            

            There were other difficulties. Both the Vatican City and Switzerland were neutral territories, but this did not make things easy. London soon learned both the Vatican and Swiss were balking at the numbers of POWs they were expected to help. The three major questions in Switzerland were how many former POWs were in route, how Adolph Hitler would react to such large numbers of Allied POWs entering Switzerland, and how the Swiss could possibly support such a huge influx of POWs when the local population had such difficulty just tying to feed themselves. The London Prisoner of War Department sent its first letter to the War Office September 10th, 1943 stating that POWs in Northern Italy might attempt to enter Switzerland and questioned the possibility that the Swiss might refuse entry of the more than 20,000 Allied POWs that might be coming.^[19] Since no one knew how many POWs the German army recaptured, no one really knew how many POWs would eventually make their way into Switzerland, but the numbers seemed staggering.

            Once it became clear the numbers of POWs would reach the tens of thousands, the Swiss authorities became very concerned about the logistical problems that would come with the large numbers showing up, overrunning their country. As a result, the British told the Swiss they could use camps to house the Allied POWs if necessary to maintain military control.^[20] Additionally, the British agreed to send sufficient food and clothing through the blockade to support the men. Lastly, the British had to decide what to do about the starving and ill-clothed Russian, Yugoslavs,  and Greek POWs. Could the British unilaterally decide on whether to give them food and uniforms too? Eventually, the British government decided that food and clothing would be provided for the Russian POWs too, but the uniforms would not have anything sewn onto them.^[21]  However, the Swiss were not the only ones concerned about being overrun by POWs. The Vatican City had its own worries.

            Since Eisenhower announced the Italian surrender before the Italian government regained complete control of Rome, the only truly safe place for Allied POWs was the Vatican City. In one case, three British Officers escaped from a POW camp on the outskirts of Rome. An Italian doctor transported them to the Vatican City gates, where they slipped in through the gates before a German patrol could stop them.^[22] Sir D. Osborne, working as both a liaison officer and a spy for the British at the Vatican City, made sure the British officers were treated as guests. In his telegram to the War Office Seaforth stated, “I fear the Vatican, who are very nervous of German reactions, may take difficulties about this.”^[23]  Consequently, both the Swiss and the Vatican were concerned the Germans might use the evading POWs entering their territories as an excuse to invade their neutral territories. To make matters worse, a competing project termed Operation Speedwell was already underway.            

            To slow the German resupply of the Gustav Line, Operation Speedwell used the cover of escaping POWs from prison camps in Northern Italy to camouflage S.A.S. Group I activities blowing up communications, railroads, and bridges.^[24] Unofficially, London newspapers reported that evading Allied POWs were joining Italian partisans in their war effort against the Germans. The POW-Partisan link proved to be a huge morale booster in London, but in Germany, Hitler was not amused.^[25]  Hitler was so angry that at first he ordered all evading POWs shot on sight as “francs-tireurs” or spies, but then the German High Command convinced him that reciprocation by the Allies might bring reprisals against German POWs.^[26]            

            Reciprocation was one of the few ways belligerent nations had to either augment or change the Convention during a war. While Great Britain and Germany had both been original signers of the 1929 Geneva Convention, and the Convention addressed a variety of things, like capturing a combatant, evacuating POWs from war zones, basic hygiene, and how POW mail and parcels would be sent and received, it failed to define who qualified as a POW or if the POW status changed while evading captors.^[27] So while the Convention should have made the determination of legal status easier to decide, in reality, once POWs became evaders, joined partisan groups, or used weapons to fight their captors, the legal status of escaping POWs often became difficult to determine. Worse yet, because some Allied POWs did join the partisans, their war efforts threatened the safety of all other evading POWs.

            On September 16, 1943, eight days after General Eisenhower announced the formal surrender of Italy, Germany took control of Italian radio and newspapers and proclaimed that evading POWs not immediately returning to Italian POW camps or turning themselves in to the nearest German official in Rome, would lose protected status guaranteed by the Convention. Additionally, Germany warned any Italian helping Allied POWs that they would be shot too.^[28] That meant, sometime within the next few days, the German army planned to treat evading POWs, and anyone helping them, as combatants; shooting them on sight without a trial. Additionally, as time went on, Germany offered 20 liras for each POW caught and turned over to the German army.^[29]

            Over the next few days, the worried men of the London POW Department tried and failed to come up with valid legal reasons why Germany could not legally shoot Allied evaders. Instead, on September 21, the London War Office drafted its own proclamation and then used radio, newspaper, and leaflets dropped throughout Italy, France, and Germany to state that the King of England would hold anyone intentionally shooting Allied POWs personally accountable.^[30] That announcement was not a legal response, but the London Prisoner of War Office hoped it would be enough to stop the Germans from shooting evading POWs. However, the warning ultimately failed to stop the Germans from shooting fifty evading POWs from Stalag Luft III in 1944.^[31] Moreover, the September German and London proclamations demonstrate how “reciprocations” worked. As long as both nations agreed to abide by the unwritten agreements, the POWs received better treatment than was originally guaranteed by the Convention.

            While the Convention settled many issues, it left many other questions unanswered. In one potentially embarrassing case for the British, while the Germans applied Convention rules to British merchant marines, the British had not reciprocated because British merchant marines in the United Kingdom were considered civilian workers.  As civilians, British merchant marines did not qualify for any protection under the Convention. However, German merchant marines were an offshoot of German navy, so the Germans automatically applied the Convention to captured British merchant marines. That meant for much of earliest part of the war, the Germans protected British merchant marines better than the British protected German merchant marines. However, after the discrepancy was discovered, the British quietly changed the way all merchant marines were treated because the British did not want German propaganda used to publicly embarrass the British. So in the end, the British reciprocated the German treatment of merchant marines and applied Convention protection to all civilian merchant marines. Not only was that one example of how reciprocation worked, it was also the first time the Convention gave civilians protection.^[32] 

            In another important case of reciprocation, the British War Room overruled its own Foreign Office when it began transporting Italian POWs from North Africa to Canada. The Foreign Office had argued that transporting POWs out of safe zones through war zones violated the Convention. To transfer POWs from North Africa to Canada, the Italian POWs were first transported to England and then across the North Atlantic. German U-boats threatened British shipping in the North Atlantic and since the British ships would be transporting the Italian POWs through the North Atlantic, the Foreign Office correctly argued the POW transportation through the shipping war zone violated Article 87 of the Convention. Even so, the London War Room overruled the Foreign Office, and Italian POWs soon found themselves in Canada.^[33] Because Britain and the United States transported POWs across the North Atlantic war zone, Germany and Italy then reciprocated by transporting Allied POWs from North Africa first into Italy and then into Germany. However, Allied POWs were safer during their trip to Italy because not only was the trip across the Mediterranean Sea shorter, but the Allies had also broken the German and Italian military codes.^[34] This allowed the Allies to avoid sinking ships containing POWs and humanitarian supplies. In doing so, the POWs continued receiving vital humanitarian supplies like food, blankets, and clothing they might not have gotten otherwise.^[35]

            Before their surrender, the Italians argued Italian POWs should be returned as soon as possible. Reciprocation, they argued, then would guarantee the Italian government would release the Allied POWs once the surrender was public. Eisenhower agreed in principle, however because Italian POWs were spread out all over North America, Africa, and Sicily, he only immediately released the POWs held in Sicily. General Eisenhower understood the propaganda about releasing the Italian POWs was more important than any risk the POWs posed to the Allied war effort.^[36]

            However, one of the most important questions left unanswered by the Convention was who received protection. The Convention stated that no combatant actively fighting received protection until he either surrendered or was sufficiently injured that he no longer could fight. Additionally, the Convention stated any soldier wearing civilian clothing; paratroopers, saboteurs and spies, and civilians had no protection. However, it failed to define was the effective status of POWs who escaped their captors. The Germans announced on September 16, 1943, all escaping POWs would be reclassified an “Evaders.”^[37] The status change meant Convention protections no longer applied to escaping POWs. British and American POW offices found nothing in the Convention to argue the point and instead resorted to threatening Germany with reciprocal legal action after the war ended if needed.

            Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, knew first hand the dangers of trying to evade capture, and understandably wanted to ensure the POWs safety. Additionally, Churchill agreed with the Department of POWs, not wanting to wait until after the war to punish Germans for their atrocities. Instead, Churchill, along with the War Room, the London POW office, and MI-9,^[38] pressured the Swiss and Vatican to help secure the safety of evading Allied POWs form Italy.^[39] Additionally, on September 25, 1943, from the War Room, Churchill authorized the mission that attempted to rescue POWs trapped in Southern Italy behind the Gustav Line.^[40]

            Code-named Operation Begonia-Jonquil, the rescue attempt used the extremely well trained and hardened troops from David Sterling’s Long Range Desert Patrol (L.R.D.P.) in North Africa, by then relocated to Southern Italy. The L.R.D.P. experience fighting behind German and Italian lines in North Africa, gave them a working advantage over every other military unit in the area.  Affectionately known as David Sterling’s Desert Rats, the Commander-in-Chief, General Claude Auchinleck, told Sterling in 1941 that the L.R.D.P. formal military designation would be Special Air Service (S.A.S.) Group L.  As Auchinleck explained, the S.A.S. really did not exist, but staff officer Brigadier Dudley Clarke invented it in order to make the enemy believe British parachute troops had arrived in the Middle East.^[41] The comment is important because it discloses the importance of deception.

            Trying to deceive the Germans into believing the S.A.S. was a newly arrived parachuting group in North Africa was nothing new. It was only the latest of many deception campaigns. One of the more elaborate and dramatic deceptions involved magic. Master illusionist, Jasper Maskelyne, a third generation professional magician, used his knowledge of stage illusions, and army training in camouflage, to deceive the Germans on a grand scale. Maskelyne, for example did not stop at one unit, he made entire armies, complete with trucks, tanks, airplanes, and supply trains, appear and disappear, seemingly at will. One of his greatest successes kept the Suez Canal open to Allied shipping by making it invisible! Maskelyne used his, “whole imagination and knowledge on the problem of how best to mobilize the world of magic against Hitler.” Maskelyne, a professional magician from a magician’s family, understood better than most that, “the same optical principles that applied to stagecraft would work [in military applications] -- it was just a question of providing the proper apparatus.”^[42] However, creating an illusion was not enough, Maskelyne knew he needed to convince the person witnessing the illusion what he was seeing was real. That required the person to anticipate and expect what he was about to see. In other words, for every deception, there must be a story that explained the illusion, or else the person seeing the illusion would not believe what he was saw was real. For example, no one would believe a new army suddenly appeared camping out in the desert without first seeing evidence of troop transports being reassigned, designations, increased radio traffic, and even men wearing new insignia. All those things had to happen before the fictional troops arrived. Additionally, “The strict enforcement of the false order of battle with bogus divisional signs prominently displayed resulted in casual travelers doing the work and helping rather than hindering security.”^[43] In other words, as Maskelyne pointed out, all that deception really required was, “a bit of suggestion, a touch of knowledge about human nature, and the rather elementary use of scientific principles.” ^[44] So the S.A.S. had been created to convince German military commanders into believing a new group of paratroops had arrived in Northern Africa to attack German airfields.

            However, the real coincidence of the story is that the S.A.S. really did attack German airfields and aircraft. From the time of their conception, until their last battle in North Africa fifteen months later, the S.A.S. destroyed 257 airplanes, hundreds of supply dumps, and countless vehicles. They also managed to wreck German roads and railway communications. Surprisingly, they did it all with relatively few casualties, using speed and surprise. Mounting 50 mm machine guns on the backs of American jeeps, the L.R.D.P., or the Desert Rats as they were sometimes called, patrolled far behind German lines. To the Germans, the Desert Rats seemed to come out of nowhere. Using the speed of the jeeps to their advantage, the Rats raced onto German airfields and found aircraft waiting on the ground. Moments later, 50 mm bullets destroyed the aircraft and they raced through the airfield. Before leaving, the Rats then destroyed the German supply dumps and anything else they could find before racing back out into the seemingly endless desert to disappear in the sand.^[45] In December 1942, the Germans caught seven patrols, including David Sterling’s. It was a devastating blow, however, the successes of the Desert Rats did not go unnoticed. The command that began as a deception, continued on well after their exploits in North Africa were over. Moreover, while the S.A.S. had originally been a deception plan, the general using the deception correctly understood deception campaigns by themselves could not win a war.  Furthermore, he also knew good deceptions could cause the enemy to second guess themselves, or to put men and supplies where they would do the least good during an upcoming battle. Consequently, because of their numerous successes in North Africa, deception campaigns continued throughout the war, eventually moving into every theatre of operation, including Italy. Unfortunately for Operation Begonia-Jonquil, two of those deception campaigns, Hardman and Garfield, took place precisely where the S.A.S. tried to rescue POWs.^[46] 

             Operations Hardman and Garfield ran from October through November 1943. While Hardman tried to get the Germans to abandon the line of the River Sangro by threatening simultaneous seaborne and airborne landings near Pescara, Garfield was designed to divert German attention from a real mission by trying to convince the Germans that Allied landings behind the German right flank were immanent. When combined, these two deception campaigns used “conspicuous preparations for such a move, including WT [wireless traffic] deception ... from the North African double agents.”^[47] These two deception campaigns may be why radios were not given to Begonia-Jonquil members. Part of the deception would be to allow the Germans to successfully intercepted communications of the fictional attack. If the S.A.S. also had radio traffic during Operation Begonia-Jonquil, the S.A.S. traffic might have inadvertently caused the deception campaigns to fail. However, there is little evidence that Kesselring, the German general in charge of the defense of Southern Europe, believed either deception campaign was real. Even so, Kesselring did send some troops to the area to make sure that if they were true, the invasion would be delayed long enough to allow for German army to send in the reinforcements.

            Capt. Symes, Commander of S.A.S. group ‘D’ experienced first hand, the problem of trying to run a real mission in the same location of a deception campaign.             On October 22, 1943, Symes had been signaling for about an hour before first hearing a boat engine. Although it was after dark, Symes, had night binoculars, and could see a boat turned and approach the beach.

When it was about two hundred yards out, I looked round and saw two Germans coming towards me, about two yards away, with another two twenty yards behind. I gave a warning flash, and jumped into the bushes, as it was not advisable to fight unless forced to. One German ran back two hundred yards where we knew was a platoon post, and gave the alarm, while the remainder cocked their [weapons] and stood on the railway line looking very silly. We then started crawling away up the mountainside with P.W.s crashing through the undergrowth like a heard of elephants. By this time, the Germans were tearing down the railway line, the boat was pushing off, and we were moving as fast as possible. On arrival at the top we were baulked by a long column of horse-drawn artillery moving along the main road, which we had to cross before proceeding inland. Fortunately, our pursuers were so delighted with the contents of my pack, and my night glasses, which had been left on the railway line, that they lost valuable minutes, and we were able to cross before they arrived, and before some lorry - borne troops made their appearance on the scene. All the P.W.s had or knew of, friendly billets in the area, and I ordered them to split up, and R.V. again at the River Voro on the 25th.^[48]

            Two days later, Captain Power experienced similar landing problems. However, in Power’s case, although most of the six hundred POWs panicked and ran, sixteen POWs and several of the S.A.S. kept their cool, and managed to board the LCI, and safely return to Termoli.^[49] 

            In both cases, increased German activity probably resulted from the Allied deceptions. Some evidence now points to, and raises questions about, how Kesselring and his staff became aware of S.A.S. activities in Southern Italy. Intercepted and decoded German messages confirmed Kesselring’s staff knew the exact air and sea landing zones, and the kind of boats planned on being used for the mission. Consequently, there can now be little doubt that the German Luftwaffe sank the Italian fishing boats disrupt, or to cause Begonia-Jonquil to fail, and not to punish the Italian fishermen, or to stop the boats from being used for an invasion, as previously thought.^[50]           

            Meanwhile, in the North, the Swiss Government reported that except for those who managed to escaped, almost all 60,000 British and American POWs held north of Rome had been transferred to Germany, however, it was also impossible to say how many POWs actually succeeded in escaping from those camps.^[51] No matter where the POWs were either in Northern or Southern Italy, if they had not already found safe haven, time was quickly running out. For POWs in and around Rome hoping to find safety, one secret message sent September 27, 1943, to the Foreign Office stated,

            Situation in regards of large numbers of released or escaped British prisoners of war in             and around Rome is becoming extremely critical and difficult ... informed ... two men had             been removed from St. Peters by violence by a number of Pontifical gendarmes. ... No             doubt there will be more attempts to enter the Vatican City but it is quite possible the             gates of St. Peters will now be closed to the public and the Swiss Guard and gendarmerie             have strict orders to prevent entry of prisoners.

            In and around Rome, POWs who had hoped to find refuge in the Vatican City, now tried to find Italians willing to feed and hide them from the German army, who had a strangle hold on the city. Further south, the German army continued to build up the defenses of Gustav Line. If the Allied POWs were to be saved, a plan and its execution needed to be worked out quickly.

* * *

            Lt. Col. Symonds began the operational planning of Begonia-Jonquil on September 26, 1943. The plan split the eastern Italian coast between Ancona and the Gustav line into four areas. Two parties each; one seaborne and one airborne group would be “introduced” into each area. Once there, each airborne party would find and guide escaped POWs to the beaches for evacuation by the seaborne group. Begonia was the airborne part of the mission with Jonquil the seaborne operation. Together, they were two halves of one overall mission to rescue the Allied POWs from Italy in 1943.

            Each mission leader operated in own area, labeled A, B, C, and D. The Airborne division leaders included: S.S.M.Marshall in Area A, located between Ancona to Civitanova. Capt. Power and his men were to be in Civitanova to San Benedetto in Area B. Lt. Hibbert. In Area C, stretching from San Benedetto to Pescara, and Capt. Baillie, while Lt. McGregor and O.S.S. Lt. Borrow were in Area D.  Also in Area D, were Capt. Lee and 17 Free Frenchmen, who acted as the security and protection group, necessary because that area was closest to the main German army. Each Area leader commanded six men, except for O.S.S. Lt. Borrow, who had twelve.^[52]

            Operation Begonia began with a briefing on October 1, 1943. Lt. McGregor was in charge of the D area airborne group. His men included: Sgt. Mitchell, Cpl. Laybourne, and privates Sutton, Arnold, McQueen, and Dellow, and Ts. Cpl. Nicolich, an interpreter and member of the Office of Special Services (O.S.S.), The main question at the briefing concerned their drop zone (DZ) and the best places to land. After some debate, the McGregor and his men consulted a Royal Air Force navigator who claimed he was, “certain of this DZ on the map, and remarked that he could drop the stick on a sixpence.”^[53]

            The next day was October 2, 1943. At four p.m., eight paratroopers with four containers full of food and comforts for POWs left Bari Airfield. An hour and a half later, the navigator told McGregor it was time to jump. McGregor and his men hooked their static lines and double-checked each other’s parachutes and harnesses. Designed to open their chutes, static line jumps were safer than free falling and pulling a ripcord, but only if everything was connected properly. At precisely 5:35 p.m., McGregor leapt out airplane and discovered several things wrong almost all at once: First, although they were supposed to parachute in darkness, he and his men had jumped in daylight, plainly visible to the Italians looking up at them from the village below. McGregor looked down and tried to get his bearings; the Drop Zone looked wrong. McGregor had memorized the maps and details of the area, however looking at the terrain, he was confused. McGregor tried figure out where he was by searching the horizon. What he saw was not good. In the distance, Germans were running to cars, trucks, and a couple of motorcycles. Moments later, McGregor could not see them. They reappeared on the road leading directly under where McGregor and his men were going to land. Suddenly, McGregor knew they not where they were supposed to be. They had jumped at the wrong drop zone (DZ). Now McGregor knew where he was. The village of Chieti, with the Pescara River running through it was under him and his men. For a moment McGregor thought the wind might make them land in the river, or possibly on top of the bridge. With the Germans on their way, neither place was good.  The ground seemed to be getting bigger as they descended, and then the winds suddenly changed direction. The stick now blew away from the center of town and the river and into an open field away from the German patrol McGregor knew was racing to meet them.^[54]

            As McGregor and his men landed, they were met by hundreds of friendly peasants. McGregor said they seemed to be, “Shaking my hand before I touched the ground.” By then the, “Enemy troops were very close so I decided to leave the containers in a ditch.” Ts. Cpl. Nicolich, the O.S.S. interpreter, found a uniformed member of the local Guardua di Finaza.  The man told McGregor the Germans were coming. There was no time to lose and the moan volunteered to lead McGregor and his men to a safe place. “There was no time to doubt his good intentions, so he lead us at the double down to the Pescara River where we hid while he returned to the DZ to ask the farmer to hide the containers.”  A few minutes later, a mortar exploded near McGregor and his men. Not sure if they had been double crossed, McGregor told his men to be ready to move out in a hurry. However, then the guide returned and took them about seven miles cross-country to a farm. It was one in the morning by the time they got there. After checking the farm out and posting guards, McGregor and his men rested. They stayed for two more nights because, “The enemy were making an extensive search of the area, to capture us,” and at the time, there was no safer place to go.^[55] Had it not been for the farmers, who were part of the resistance movement, McGregor knew he and his men probably would have been caught by the German patrol. Instead, the farmers risked their lives to help McGregor and his men get away. Furthermore, the farmers hid the supplies and canisters. In return, the local women kept the silk parachutes.^[56]

            While the airborne groups of Operation Begonia had their difficulties, the seaborne groups had similar problems. Operation Jonquil started two days later. On October 4, 1943, seaborne group D landed at Punta del Moro. Unfortunately, that was seven miles south of the mouth of the River Foro, the planned landing point. Additionally, German air raids began at Termoli Harbor. Because the Germans were targeting the schooners, the Italian fishing boats could not longer be used for mission. Instead, Infantry Landing Craft (L.C.I.) ^[57] were substituted. Unfortunately, when compared to the schooners, the L.C.I.s lacked the necessary speed to make it all the way to Area A and return in darkness. That meant beach Area A had to be abandoned and be moved to beach area B, which was closer to Termoli Harbor. However, without radios to communicate, getting word to S.S.M. Marshall in Area A meant a person had to hand deliver the message.^[58]

            During the early morning hours of October 5, McGregor and his men moved to a new area near Civitella because the Italians who had helped McGregor two days earlier, said hundreds of POWs were staying there. Since McGregor knew he needed to start finding the POWs, after establishing a command post at a nearby farm, McGregor sent his men out to begin locating the POWs.^[59]

            Back at the harbor at Termoli, Capt. Charles Duffet, R.N., took over command of the harbor from Lt. Hilton, R.N.V.R. (Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve). Hilton had been the acting Liaison Officer to the S.S. Brigade. However, he took command of the harbor on his own authority when it became clear to him, and everyone else, that there was no one else with any kind of naval experience to do so. The problem, as Duffet later pointed out, was Hilton’s rank was too low to impose respect from much of the Army personnel already there. That also meant Hilton could not give orders, only suggestions, and his suggestions were rarely used. However, Hilton was used as the naval consultant for Begonia-Hilton. It was Hilton, for example, that suggested the Italian fishing boats as the transport. It was also Hilton who helped choose the locations for the drop and landing zones. Therefore, after Duffet took over, Lt. Col Symonds explained Begonia-Jonquil to Duffet, and asked for help. The first thing Duffet did to help the operation, was retain three LCIs because the Germans were sinking the Italian fishing boats. For an undisclosed reason, Duffet ordered the rest of the LCIs to Barletta. ^[60]

            Later that night, seaborne parties from areas A, B, and C, offloaded from the L.C.I.s.  However, just like group ‘D’ who parachuted into the interior earlier, the seaborne groups disembarked at the wrong places. For example, Groups A and B disembarked together, four miles from the mouth of the Minoochio River at Grottamare, and Group C disembarked eight miles from their proposed area north of the mouth of the Salinello River. Furthermore, the boat scheduled to rendezvous with the men at group D never made contact, even though Capt. Baillie stated he heard the boat and repeatedly signaled.^[61]            

            The next day, October 6, the Germans dug in on the outskirts of Termoli, shelled the harbor, town, and divisional buildings just as 38 Brigade was disembarking. Fortunately, none of the boats or ships were damaged. That night, Duffet ordered the three LCIs as far north as Grottamare, and to continue going out each night until the evening of October 9th, when Duffet decided to halt operations until the light of the full moon passed on October 22. However, because the S.A.S. had no radios, Duffet told the LCI’s to go out that night too, make contact, and to give out the new orders.^[62]

            On the night of October 9, and into the early morning hours of October 10, one of the LCIs waited offshore area B, near the mouth of the Minoochio River.  After five days of trying to make contact, the shore party and boat crew finally made contact. However, the men who parachuted as part of Begonia, failed to get POWs to the beach. To make up for the lack of POWs, and because no one from Jonquil had not yet contacted the men of Begonia, the Jonquil shore party split up into groups of four and looked for POWs themselves.^[63]

            On October 10, Capt. Lee and the Free French S.A.S., keeping watch over two hundred POWs about three hours before the official rendezvous, saw a boat using a bright light signal the shore. A return light signaled from the shore. Lee became suspicious and investigated. On the beach, three German soldiers hid behind a small boat on shore; Lee shot them all. Seconds later, the boat sped off. After the boat left, Lee went back to the hiding POWs and told what happened, and then instructed the POWs to leave the area, and hide the best they could. Lee then knew the Germans knew the S.A.S. boat signals, and knew POWs were in the area. It would not be long before German patrols came. Consequently, Lt. Lee and Capt. Baillie made the decision to move independently with their parties to Gugnoli. Unfortunately, S.A.S. member Pct Fawthorpe accidentally shot himself in the foot cleaning his weapon. With no other choice, Fawthorpe was left behind.^[64]

            Two days later, on October 12, Lt. McGregor, still at the farm he was using as a command post, received a message from the coast, no more boats would come until after the full moon. The next planned rendezvous would be October 22, 1943.  As Duffet explained, the full moon made it too dangerous for boats to travel on the water unseen. So Duffet made the decision not to send any more boats until after the night sky got darker. The next planned rendezvous was October 22, because that was the date the last quarter of the moon began.^[65]

            To help make up for the delay, S.S.M. Marshall took charge of the rear party left behind by the LCI. He hoped his additional men could protect more POWs waiting for the next groups of boats.  However, on the morning of October 21, 2011, a large group of Germans surprised Pct Cook and Pct. Fitzgerald as they stood guard. Both men were taken prisoner. That morning, Marshall, discovered the men were missing. Without waiting, found one man standing next to a tree. As he got closer, the man whispered, “Germans!” Marshall then ran up and shot and killed the two German guards. However neither Cook nor Fitzgerald were able to get away. Marshall only managed to elude the German patrols by hiding in the thick brush for several hours. The German patrols, having lost Marshall in the firefight, took out their frustrations by tossing hand grenades at bushes and shooting anything that moved. Eventually, the Germans gave up and left the area with Cook and Fitzgerald in tow.^[66] The Germans then handed over Pct Cook, Pct Fitzgerald, and thirteen recaptured POWs to the Carabinieri, who moved the entire group to Mognturano. On November 18, all twenty-one POWs managed to escape when U.S. Aircraft strafed the Carabinieri, who then immediately fled their guard posts.^[67]

            Everyone met back at the beach with approximately 600 POWs on 24 October. Capt. Power, now in charge of security at the beach, sent out several groups of men to patrol and watch the road and beach from several different vantage places along the beach. Additionally, Power sent another group to a house three miles up the beach known to be used by the Germans as a look out and radio house. Throughout the afternoon of the 24th, German bicycle patrols road up and down the road. Each time, the beach security forces hid and watched.  Later that night, just after midnight, shots fired in the night stampeded all but 23 POWs. Those 23 POWs embarked and returned to Termoli later that morning. Captain Power, Tong, and Pct. Maybury stayed behind hoping they might rescue more POWs.^[68] 

            Not everyone had such an exciting time. For example, Lt. E. C. Lite was a former Italian POW. After making his way to Termoli, he joined the S.A.S. because wanted to help rescue more POWs. He left Termoli on October 27, 1943, and travelled with Captain Lee and Sgt. Scott on an Italian Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB) to Silvi Beach, where they disembarked, spent the night at the farm being used as the S.A.S. headquarters, and traveled to meet Major Gordon, who was holding up in the mountains. Using an Italian guide, they traveled throughout the day on secondary roads. Once they met Gordon, they gave him money, maps, and compasses, and the orders to collect 500 English speaking POWs and wait for Capt. Lee. Lite and Scott then returned to Silvi, all without seeing a single German.^[69]

            However, once back the headquarters, Lite was given the job to signal boats. For the next three nights he signal boats that never arrived. However, on the night of November 2, Lite watched helplessly as Germans machine guns and a 20 mm gun fired on a boat sitting a mile and a half off shore. The boat rocked and turned onto its side as it was hit, then a fire broke out in the engine room, and an hour later, the boat blew up. Not knowing for sure if that boat was the one he was waiting for, Lite used the light to signal as he was told. However, by three in the morning, he and the others, making up the security force, returned to their headquarters.

            Early that morning, Lt. Calf, R.N., and Midshipman Draper arrived at the headquarters and told their story. Capt. Lee finally arrived even later in the morning with a wounded right shoulder and told a similar story. Lee explained the Germans shot him in the shoulder as he ran from the beach, and through the trees to safety.^[70]

             Lite stated, “Knowing that our boat had been sunk, I gave the fifteen POWs I had collected, some money and what aid I could, and dispersed them, to make their own way.” The Italian boat bringing Capt. Lee to shore was the one hit by German heavy machine gun coastal fire as Lite watched. Capt. Lee, Lt. Calf of the Royal Navy, and Midshipman Draper were forced to swim ashore. However, as they ran from the shore into the trees, Capt. Lee was hit by German gunfire. Even though he was wounded, Captain Lee, Calf and Draper managed to meet Capt. Baillie’s party. They treated Lee the best they could, but left Lee with Sgt. Scott, and Soldat Ken to rest and recuperate until it was safe for him to move.^[71]

            However, also on November 3, a message from Gordon arrived saying the Germans arrived and recaptured several POWs. The rest scattered into the relative safety of the mountains. Possibly in retaliation, and possibly to scare the civilians into not helping the POWs, the Germans burned two houses. Eventually, the S.A.S. contacted Maj. Gordon, who then returned with an Italian officer, and four POWs. On November 12, Maybury using an Italian schooner, returned to Termoli with nine POWs. However, Captains Power, Tong, and Miller, and five POWs, also used an Italian schooner, this one overloaded and in danger of sinking, to sail past a sleeping German guard. They returned to Termoli on November 20, 1943.^[72]

            In all, S.S.M. Marshall saved twenty-three POWs, Pct Maybury nine, and Captains Power and Tong brought five more POWs back to Termoli for a total of thirty-seven POWs saved out of more than six hundred contacted. Additionally, the Germans captured S.A.S. members Pct Cook and Pct. Fitzgerald who then escaped a month later. Pct Fawthorpe shot himself in the foot, however, managed to get back to Allied territory unmolested by the Germans. One boat was destroyed with three men onboard killed; three men others managed to swim to shore and disappear into the trees. However, once in the trees, Germans managed to shoot Capt. Lee shoulder. He managed to get to safety, but was seriously injured in the process. At the end of the mission, the men involved in Operation Begonia-Jonquil interpreted the mission as a failure.

            Officially, Operation Begonia-Jonquil failed for many reasons. First, it failed because the too little time was available to prepare for the mission. For example, it was three o’clock in the afternoon, September 30, 1943, when Captains Power and Austin first learned of the “parachute operation to rescue liberated prisoners in German occupied Italy.”^[73] Before the mission, they had sailed an Italian schooner from Trani to Barletta where they received orders form Major Symes^[74] to drive by jeep to Brindisi, where they met Colonel Symonds at ten-thirty at night. During the interview, Power and Symes, who had discussed the mission during the road trip, suggested boats might be better than attempting to parachute behind German lines. They argued the length of the Italian coast made arriving by boat much safer than dealing with the dangers inherent to parachuting. Col. Symonds agreed to have some of the force arrive by boat. Symonds then offered British Army commandos as a security force. However, Maj. Symes asked for, and then received permission for members of the Free French military to join the mission instead. The meeting lasted until two a.m. Afterwards, the two men discoved no food was available from the mess. To make matters worse, there was no place to sleep in Brindisi either. Instead, Symes and Power ate their personal provisions and slept in an olive grove outside town. The next morning, they returned to Barletta by jeep and collected the rest of their squadron. Lt. Hibbert “found” transportation for the rest of squadron, and they left for Bari at dusk. Power and Austin both agreed, October 1st, had been another “grueling day.” ^[75] Twenty-four hours later, with very little preparation, four groups of eight men, dropped into German held territory to begin their search for liberated Allied POWs. The lack of preparation proved disastrous to the mission.

            Lack of time, also meant the assumptions were not checked for accuracy. For example, Lt. Hilton, R.N.V.R. assumed the Germans would leave Italian fishing boats unmolested along the coast of Italy. Accordingly, part of the plan was to use the fishing boats because the S.A.S. hoped the schooners would look like all the rest of the Italian fishing boats. That way, the boats could wait at strategic points along the coast for signaling lights to call the boats whenever POWs reached the beaches. Then it would be a simple matter for the boats to pick up and transport the POWs back to allied lines. However, almost when the Begonia-Jonquil began, the German Luftwaffe began sinking every Italian boat large enough to move men or supplies. Consequently, that meant the Italian schooners normally seen fishing off the coast of Italy were absent. Therefore, using schooners to camouflage the transportation of POWs became impractical.^[76]

            Another assumption was that it would be relatively easy to find specific points along the Italian coast. However, in practice, the Italian coast looked surprisingly similar no matter where the men put ashore. The original planned rendezvous points were supposed to be located near the mouths of key rivers. It was thought those points would have more foliage, be easier to hide POWs, and be easier to find. In practice though, all the rivers looked the same to men without local knowledge. Therefore, finding the mouths of any one specific river proved just as difficult as finding any other point along the coast.^[77]

            Communications issues also plagued the mission. Although S.A.S. members asked for radios throughout the mission, each time Allied Command denied their requests, saying there were not enough radios, and other groups had priority. The original plan was to have the boats waiting off shore had changed, and both the commanders and planners thought signal lights would be more than adequate to ensure mission success. However, once the boats had to travel long distances, signal lights proved inadequate. Therefore, since no short range or long range radios existed, once the men landed behind German lines, they were effectively cut off from, and ignorant about, any mission changes. That ignorance caused delays that put many POWs at risk, as changes to rendezvous locations and dates were not communicated to the men in the field.^[78]             The two most important changes were the changes from the schooners to LCI’s, and the change of rendezvous dates, needed to allow the light of the full moon to pass. Without radio communications, once the decision had been made to use LCI’s instead of schooners, hand delivered messages had to be sent to men operating in area ‘D’ putting additional lives at risk. Additionally, ‘D’ was no longer a valid pickup point because the LCI’s could not travel that distance and return to the relative safety of Termoli in a single night. That meant everyone in ‘D’ then moved into area C, where the S.A.S. groups joined forces and concentrated their combined efforts over the next three weeks.^[79]

            Additionally, the mission to send messages was just as dangerous for the man delivering the message, as for the boat crew responsible to get the man there. In one case it proved deadly. Of the men assigned to transport Capt. Lee, besides Lee, only two others survived. Four others on board died. Although Capt. Lee, survived, he needed care for a bullet wound.  Eventually, Capt. Lee did safely make it back to Allied lines. However, by not assigning radios, the Allied Command Center put men needlessly at risk when radio communications could have been used.^[80]

            Another major issue was that time constraints meant adequate supplies could not be found before the mission began. Begonia-Jonquil began in the fall, when fickle weather along the Adriatic made planning difficult. The biggest problem the men had been trying to decide between warm and cold weather boots and clothing, the mission planners let the men decide for themselves what to wear. Several mission statements concluded American boots and clothing worked well in the short term, however, in rainy weather, they became nearly worthless. Additionally, not having enough pairs of socks was the one item almost every man writing a war diary agreed they lacked. Lastly, the men failed to bring enough food, without radios to request more supplies, the men were forced to eventually turn to the local civilian inhabitants for help.^[81]

            One problem the planners could not account for was suspicion. Italian locals regarded all armed men with suspicion. Although the S.A.S. wore British uniforms throughout the mission, Italians and POWs alike often initially mistook the S.A.S. men for German soldiers, thus making contact difficult with both the civilians and POWs. However, once contact was made, the SA.S. learned how to approach civilians from the POWs. Generally, if a civilian immediately returned with food, he was safe to deal with. However, if he returned without food, he was a German collaborator and not to be trusted. Additionally, poor farmers, those with only one haystack and cow were much more likely to help the Allies than wealthier farmers. Often times, the farmers were too helpful, because the POWs then were reluctant to leave.^[82]

            Marshaling POWs away from the helpful farmers became more difficult as Begonia-Jonquil progressed for several reasons. First, POWs had lousy security and often talked among themselves. When rendezvous after rendezvous failed, the POWs became less and less willing to follow S.A.S. orders. Second, months of incarceration and forced inactivity inside Italian camps proved costly because POWs had forgotten their military training and bearings. Accordingly, the POWs lost self-confidence, discipline, and ability. When they moved, they were noisy, could not follow in a line, and had a tendency to panic at the slightest provocation. Those issues became acute at coastal rendezvous, when the POWs were told to stay quiet for long periods of time.^[83] 

            Navigational foul-ups also severely hampered the mission. Because the Italian coast had no identifiable features, everything looked the same. Finding a single place along the coast as the fall weather changed was a formidable task for the best navigators. However, few naval officers and navigators were at Termoli, and the best navigators were not part of the mission. There simply was not enough time to find and outfit naval personnel to be part of the mission. Consequently, Italians were employed as navigators because it was incorrectly assumed they knew their own coastline, and could do the job sufficiently enough to ensure mission success. However, as it turned out, once the schooners were replaced with LCIs, any advantage to having Italian fishermen as part of the mission was lost. Furthermore, as navigating the sea proved difficult, so did navigating the air.^[84]

            Air Force navigators dropped S.A.S. sticks not only in the wrong locations but also at the wrong time. Consequently, the S.A.S. groups had find safety from German patrols before they could do anything else, like figure out their real locations, before moving off to where they were supposed to be. Because Ultra had broken the German military codes, the Allied Command had a good idea where German army patrols were located. The Allied Command then strongly suggested the drop zones and rendezvous based on that information. However, navigational issues plagued the Allied rescue attempt throughout the mission, and lack of radios forced the S.A.S. members to fend for themselves, once they figured out where they were.^[85]

            While those conclusions were valid, they failed to recognize the roles other events and missions played in the failure of Begonia-Jonquil. For example, several Allied plans tried to take advantage of Field Marshall Kesselring’s defensive buildup along the Gustav line. According to the fictional plans, the Allies were planning two different flanking movements; one on each coast behind the Gustav line. However, Kesselring was not fooled; he recognized the fictitious flanking movements for what they were. However doubts remained, so while not completely ruling out the possibility they attacks were real, Kesselring sent patrols to the most likely places the Allied landings could take place. Unfortunately, Begonia and Jonquil used several of those landing zones for rendezvous locations. So just as the boats began making planned landings, the Germans increased their patrols into the same areas.^[86]

            In a twist of fate, S.S.M. Marshall correctly deduced that the Germans knew the S.A.S. was attempting to rescue the Allied POWs.^[87]  The same decoded messages that told where the German army was, also conclusively showed the Germans not only knew about Begonia-Jonquil, but also knew its drop-zones, and rendezvous location. That meant the navigational errors that caused so much confusion early in the mission, probably saved the S.A.S. from the Germans. Additionally, Kesselring was so confident his men could capture the paratroopers that he only sent a small group of Germans into the areas. Consequently, accidentally dropping the paratroopers, and accidentally landing the men in the wrong places along the coast, probably saved the mission from total disaster.^[88]

            The obvious conclusion from Ultra documents is a German spy was either part of the planning for Operation Begonia-Jonquil or had gained sufficient mission knowledge from almost the very beginning.  Of the known men associated with the mission, only one man seemed to be in the ideal position to inform the Germans of the planned rescue and then its sabotage efforts once it became clear the German patrols failed to intercept the paratroopers and shore patrols. Additionally, German aircraft until did not target Italian fishing boats until after Operation Begonia-Jonquil began. Then, decrypted German messages proved they know almost immediately after the fishing boats had been changed to LCIs. Furthermore, although Duffet made the final decision himself, it seems logical that someone else probably suggested the rendezvous schedule should be changed to allow the passage of the full moon. It would have been a simple thing to suggest to Duffet sending boats to the rendezvous points was too dangerous in the bright moonlight. This in spite that rain and overcast nights during that two-week period made boat landings ideal. However, once the two weeks were up and the rendezvous began again, it seemed as if by magic that the Germans began setting traps for the S.A.S. in areas they were operating in, and on the very beaches they planned to use. When those traps failed, the Germans showed up at the real rendezvous points, and in at least two cases, managed to disrupt the rendezvous enough that many POWs panicked and ran.^[89]

            While there no direct evidence linking this person with the German intelligence, no one other individual was positioned correctly and at the correct times, to create such havoc. Although it all could be a coincidence, circumstantial evidence points directly at this one individual as being the primary reason Begonia-Jonquil failed to deliver more liberated POWs than it did. Further investigation is needed to either prove the man was a traitor, or to vindicate his actions.^[90] 

            However, although the overall mission failed, there were some successes. For example, the S.A.S. rescued almost 50 POWs and gained excellent intelligence about the Gustav Line and the territories behind it. Additionally, the S.A.S. and POWs identified Italians who collaborated with Germans, or put themselves at great risk by helping the Allied POWs. While some Allied casualties did occur, the casualties could have been worse. POWs and members of the S.A.S. managed to escape Italy by boats, others returned to Allied lines by sneaking through the Gustav Line. Those that did gave Allied commanders hope the Gustav Line could be penetrated. Lastly, while the mission was a tactical failure, it succeeded as part of a much larger strategic plan. By forcing the Germans to use men and supplies to shore up Italian defenses, it took valuable German resources away from the defense of France and the Russian Front.

            In conclusion, as seen from afar, the simple failure of Begonia-Jonquil was much more complicated than originally thought. It was also a greater victory than any man in the S.A.S. could have possibly have known. In the end, Begonia-Jonquil might best be judged by what Germans war propaganda claimed about the mission:

The Allies have been employing, for some time past, chiefly along the Adriatic coast, special squads, which can be best designated as ‘dodger squads. On dark nights these squads land far inland into the hinterland by means of parachutes or by submarines, and are charged with the task of picking up Anglo-American prisoners who escaped from prisoners of war camps after September the 9th. and are still roaming about. The squads the ‘filter’ the former prisoners through the German font lines. Fresh commando troops, provided with large amounts of Italian currency and equipped with the most modern wireless-telephone sets, are used for these operations. Italian soldiers, with a special knowledge of locality, have also been used. Recently, one squad offered a Pescara fisherman 50,000 lire to ferry the group along the coast to the Allied front. Through the vigilance of the German troops and the assistance of the Italian population, many of the commando groups have been caught.^[91]

            The German propaganda exaggerated its successes. What it referred to as many commando groups, turned out to be two S.A.S. men. Within a month, they both also escaped from the Germans.

           

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^[1] Captain Power, Operation Jonquil, Report, National Archives, London, England, WO218/181.

^[2] Charles T. O’Reilly, Forgotten Battles: Italy's War of Liberation, 1943-1945, (Lexington Books, Oxford, 2001).

^[3] Roy Farren, Winged Dagger: Adventures on Special Service. London: Cassel Military Classics, 1948. Reprint, 1998.

^[4] “Signaling arrangements were not satisfactory, walkie-talkies between shore and ship might have been useful. Wireless communication with the base would have prevented the ignorance of the parties of the amended orders issued.” Operation Jonquil, WO218/181, National Archives, London, England.

^[5] G.A. Sheppard, The Italian Campaign 1943-1945: A Political and Military Re-Assessment. (Praeger,  New York, 1968), pages 139-140 and Malcolm Tudor, British Prisoners of War in Italy: Paths to Freedom.(Emilia Publishing, Woodlands, UK, 2000).

^[6] Malcolm Tudor, Escape from Italy: 1943-1945, (Emilia Publishing, Woodlands, UK, 2003), and Malcolm Tudor, Prisoners and Partisans: Escape and Evasion in World War II Italy, (Emilia Publishing, Woodlands, UK:, 2006, and Manchester Guardian, "Escaped Prisoners Said to Have Joined Italians,” 21 Sep 1943, and Roy Farren, Winged Dagger: Adventures on Special Service. London: Cassel Military Classics, 1948. Reprint, 1998, and Paul Brickhill, The Great Escape, and Arthur A Durand, Stalag Luft III: The Secret Story, (Paperback ed. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), and Aimé Bonifas, Prisoner 20-801: A French National in the Nazi Labor Camps, (Translated by Jr. Claude R. Foster, Mildred M. Van Sic. 5th edition ed. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987. Reprint, 1987), and Dawn Trimble Bunyak, Our Last Mission: A World War II Prisoner in Germany (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003).

^[7] Roy Farren, Winged Dagger: Adventures on Special Service (Castle Military Classics, London,1948. Reprint, 1998).

^[8] “Signaling arrangements were not satisfactory, walkie-talkies between shore and ship might have been useful. Wireless communication with the base would have prevented the ignorance of the parties of the amended orders issued.” Operation Jonquil, Summary of Events, WO218/181.

^[9] Operation Jonquil, Summary of Events, WO 218/181, National Archives, London, England.

^[10] Special Messages for the Prime Minister, HW 1/2076, National Archives, London, England.

^[11] Leo Marx, Between Silk and Cyanide: A Codemaker's War, 1941-1945, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), pages 358-362, and Minutes, "War Cabinet Conclusions, 127 (43), 13 September 1943." War Cabinet, London, England, 1943, KW 24/47, 16 Sep 1943, National Archives, London, England.

^[12] Cipher Telegram 10 Sep from A.F.H.Q Algiers. Adv CP to The War Office, AGWAR, C in C Middle East, 15 Army Group, Read 11 Sep 1943, KW24/37 from FO 916.

^[13] Lloyd Clark. Anzio: Italy and the Battle for Rome-1944, (Grove Press, New York, 2006), p 37.

^[14] See Map Image 1, Gustav Line, September 1943.

^[15] Lloyd Clark. Anzio: Italy and the Battle for Rome-1944, (Grove Press, New York, 2006), p. 274.

^[16] Gerhard L. Weinberg A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II,  2nd ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 622.

^[17] Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnws.htm included provisions for many, but not all issues concerning POWs during WWII. Whatever the Convention failed to address, the countries involved generally used “reciprocation” to enforce. 

^[18] Shepperd, G.A. The Italian Campaign 1943-1945: A Political and Military Re-Assessment. (Praeger, New York, 1968), pages 139-140.

^[19] Letter from St. C.H.Roberts, Esp. C.M.G., M.C. Prisoners of War Department, Devonshire House, Piccadilly, W.1. to The War Office, Curzon Street House, London, KW 24/37, National Archives, London, England.

^[20] Originally, because few POWs were expected, the entire Department of POWs consisted of two people. However, by Oct 9, 1943 it was then known that 1,200 British former POWs had escaped and were now in Switzerland. Once the POWs began causing problems for international relations, the Department of POWs grew, as did the numbers of people at their meetings. For example, this important meeting included Lt. Col. H.J. Phillimore (War Office Chairman), Sir Harold Satew (Foreign Office), 2 members of the General Post Office, 2 members British Red Cross Society, 6 other members of the War Office, and a secretary, Miss L. Thomas. Thomas, L. Secretary. Meeting Minutes, Room 207, Curzon Street House, 11.00 Hours on Saturday, 9th October, 1943, edited by War Office, 1943. F.O.916. B.H.2732, National Archives, London, England.

^[21] Telegram No.4319 from Berne to Foreign Office, Sep 12, 1943, KW 24/37, National Archives, London England.

^[22] Another British Spy William Simpson, working inside the Vatican City, organized an entire Italian escape network. Charles T. O’Reilly, Forgotten Battles: Italy's War of Liberation, 1943-1945, (Lexington Books, Oxford, 2001), page 209.

^[23] Telegram No. 355 from Sir D. Osborne, Holy See to Foreign Office, Sep 11, 1943, KW 24/37, National Archives, London, England.

^[24] Lt. Greville C Bell, 2nd S.A.S. Regiment: Operation Speedwell: Sept-November 1943, WO 218/177, National Archives, London, Englad.

^[25] Daily Mail Special. "Unseen Army in Italy."  21 Sep 1943, and Manchester Guardian, "Escaped Prisoners Said to Have Joined Italians."  21 Sep 1943.

^[26] The Times, "German Proclamation: British Prisoners in Italy," 16 Sep 1943.

^[27] The Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, was comprised of 97 articles and laid down the general principles for the ethical treatment of POWs. The document specifically stated that along with treating POWs humanely, “They must be protected from acts of violence, insults and public curiosity; in addition it is forbidden to carry out reprisals against them.” http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnws.htm

^[28] The Times, "German Proclamation: British Prisoners in Italy," 16 Sep 1943.

^[29] Daily Telegraph, "Germans Offer 20 Lira a Prisoner: Escapes in Italy.", 21 Sep 1943.

^[30] Meeting Minutes attended by representatives of the Foreign Office and the War Office, 21 Sep 1943, W/O 24/37, National Archives, London, England.

^[31] Eventually known as The Great Escape, only three of seventy-four evading POWs managed to return to Allied lines. True to the Allied proclamation, the British eventually brought the Germans responsible for shooting the fifty POWs to justice. Arthur A. Durand, Stalag Luft III: The Secret Story. Paperback ed. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999, pg. 359-362, and Paul Brickhill. The Great Escape. New York: Fawcett Crest, 1950. Reprint, 1978, pages 222-236.

^[32] Bob Moore, and Kent Fedorowich. The British Empire and Its Italian Prisoners of War, 1940-1947, (Palgrave, New York, 2002), pages 18-19, and The Times, "German Proclamation: British Prisoners in Italy," 16 Sep 1943.

^[33] Bob Moore, and Kent Fedorowich. The British Empire and Its Italian Prisoners of War, 1940-1947, page 16.

^[34] Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War: The First Account of World War II’s Greatest Secrets, Based on Official Documents, (Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., London, 1978), and Leo Marx, Between Silk and Cyanide: A Codemaker's War: 1941-1945, (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1998).

^[35] Lecture: Niall Barr, WWII British Studies, Kings College, London, England, July 4-5, 2011.

^[36] Bob Moore, and Kent Fedorowich. The British Empire and Its Italian Prisoners of War, 1940-1947, pages 142-143.

^[37] Letter dated September 21, 1943, from Michael Palairet, Department of Prisoners of War, to the War Office, London, England, In Response to the German Proclamation of 16 Sep 1943, KW 24/37, National Archives, London, England.

^[38] MI-9 was responsible for helping Allied POWs escape and evade capture. The United States also had a POW escape office. Normally, U.S. military gives their own acronyms to military offices, but in this case, the officers in charge named themselves MI-X, to pay homage to the great work MI-9 had already accomplished.

^[39] Michael Palairet, Meeting Minutes: Department of Prisoners of War: In Response to the German Proclamation Regarding British Prisoners Of War In Italy: 16 Sep 1943, KW 24/37, National Archives, London, England.

^[40] Operation Begonia-Jonquil, Summary of Events.

^[41] Virginia Cowles, Sterling's Desert Raiders: The Story of David Sterling and His Desert Command, (1958, Bantam Books, Toronto, 1985 paperback edition), p. 15.

^[42] David Fisher, The War Magician, (Berkley Books, New York, 1983), preface quote.

^[43] Jon Latimer, Deception In War, (The Overlook Press, Woodstock, NY, 2001), page 155.

^[44] David Fisher, The War Magician, pages 7-8, 147-156.

^[45] Virginia Cowles, Sterling's Desert Raiders: The Story of David Sterling and His Desert Command, page 291.

^[46] Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception In The Second World War, (Skyhorse Publishing, New York, 2007), pages 386-388, 821.

^[47] Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception In The Second World War, page 386.

^[48] Capt. Symes, Operation Jonquil: “Report on Operation in ‘D’ area under command of Capt. Symes.” WO 218/181, National Archives, London, England.

^[49] Capt. Power, Operation Jonquil: “Report on Operation under command of Capt. Power.” WO 218/181, National Archives, London, England.

^[50] Intercepted and decrypted German messages, CX/MSS/3310/T4, time stamped 1530 on Oct 3, 1943: (German message states: In the early morning enemy landing at G 60 (Termoli H 8278),”With 3 large and 5 small vessels. Fighting in G 60. No communications with battle group operating there. Available elements of 16 Panzer Division dispatched to clean up situation. Signed IC, Stamped 1030, 3 Oct: Part three: Sea Situation: Taranto and Brindisi harbours, increase of occupation: 140,000 tons. Recce of Tyrrhenian Sea with no special incidents. Near Termoli apparently 4 small vessels, 1 LST, observed at sea.” Obviously, from this decoded message, the Germans knew the S.A.S. had arrived in the area around Termoli on 2 Oct 1943. Special Messages, HW 1/2076, National Archives, London, England.

^[51] Telegram No. 5008 from Mr. Norton (Berne) to Foreign Office concerning numbers of POWs who escaped from camps in areas north of Rome, 20 Sep 1943. KW 24/37, National Archives, London, England.

^[52] Operation Jonquil, Summary of Operation, WO 218/181.

^[53] A “stick” was a group of paratroopers all connected to the same aircraft static line. As each man on the “stick” jumped out of the aircraft, his parachute would be automatically pulled out by the line attached to the aircraft. Some aircraft had room for two sticks. In that case, the two “sticks” would egress the aircraft from doors on each side. However, in this case, the all the men jumped from one door. Lt. McGregor, Operation Begonia, WO 218/178, National Archives, London.

^[54] Lt. McGregor, Operation Begonia, WO 218/178, National Archives, London, England.

^[55] Lt. McGregor, Operation Begonia, WO 218/178.

^[56] Lt. McGregor, Operation Begonia.

^[57] L.C.I. stood for Landing Craft - Infantry.

^[58] Operation Jonquil, WO 218/181.

^[59] Lt. McGregor, Operation Begonia.

^[60] Charles H. Duffet, RN, Evaluation of Escaped Allied POWs from Ancona -- Termoli Area, by sea. Report to 15 Army Group, October 17, 1943, ADM/13397, National Archives, London, England.

^[61] Lt. McGregor, Operation Begonia.

^[62] Charles H. Duffet, RN, Evaluation of Escaped Allied POWs from Ancona -- Termoli Area, by sea.

^[63] Operation Jonquil, Summary, WO 218/181.

^[64] Fawthorpe hid behind a farmhouse until his foot healed and eventually made his way back to Allied lines on Christmas Eve, December 24, 1943. Operation Jonquil, Fawthorpe Personal Report, WO 218/181, National Archives, London, England.

^[65] Charles H. Duffet, RN, Evaluation of Escaped Allied POWs from Ancona -- Termoli Area, by sea.

^[66] S.S.M. Marshal, Operation Jonquil, War Diary, WO 218/181, National Archives, London, England.

^[67] Capt. M.D. Ryan, R.V.R, Operation Jonquil, Extract from Appendix C. to C.S.D.I.C/ AFHQ/SKP/391, WO218/181, National Archives, London, England.

^[68] Captain Power, Operation Jonquil, Report, WO 218/181, National Archives, London, England.

^[69] Lt. E. C. Lite, Operation Jonquil, Report, WO 218/181, National Archives, London, England.

^[70] Lt. E. C. Lite, Operation Jonquil, Report, WO 218/181. and Capt. Lee, Operation Jonquil, Report, WO 218/181, National Archives, London, England.

^[71] Captain Lee, Operation Jonquil, Report, WO 218/181.

^[72] Captain Power, Operation Jonquil, Report, WO 218/181, National Archives, London, UK.

^[73] Col. B.M. F. Franks, Operational Report: S.A.S. REGT. IN ITALY: Taranto - Termoli, WO 218/176, National Archives, London, England.

^[74] It remains unclear from the documentation if Major Symes was any relation to Captain Symes. However, it was not unusual for brothers to fight alongside one another in the S.A.S. After the Germans captured David Sterling, Peter Sterling remained in command of S.A.S. 2nd Regiment. However, Peter Sterling resigned over policy disagreements shortly before being redeployed to Italy. The prevailing joke among the people who knew about the L.R.D.P. in North Africa was that S.A.S. stood for “Sterling and Sterling.” Cowles, Virginia. Sterling's Desert Raiders: The Story of David Sterling and His Desert Command, 1985 edition, Toronto: Bantam Books, Toronto, 1985 paperback reprint), p. 292.

^[75] Col. B.M. F. Franks, Operational Report: S.A.S. REGT. IN ITALY: Taranto - Termoli, WO 218/176.

^[76] Operation Jonquil: Summary.

^[77] Operation Jonquil: Summary.

^[78] Operation Jonquil: Summary.

^[79] Operation Jonquil: Summary.

^[80] Operation Jonquil, Summary, and Captain Lee, Operation Jonquil, Report, WO 218/181, National Archives, London, England.

^[81] Operation Jonquil, Summary.

^[82] Operation Jonquil, Summary.

^[83] Operation Jonquil, Summary.

^[84] Operation Jonquil, Summary.

^[85] Lt. McGregor, Operation Begonia, Summary Report.

^[86] Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception In The Second World War, (Skyhorse Publishing, New York, 2007), p. 386.

^[87] S.S.M. Marshall, Operation Jonquil, Report, WO 218/181, National Archives, London.

^[88] Operation Jonquil, Summary.

^[89] Operations Begonia and Jonquil: Summaries of events.

^[90] Operations Begonia and Jonquil: Summaries.

^[91] Extracted from A.F.H.Q. Psychological Warfare Branch Radio Monitoring Bulletin No. 70. Gueuther Weber, Axis News: 25 December 1943, Italian Front: Gueuther Weber, Transocean’s Special War Correspondent.  Operation Jonquil, Summary.