Thursday, May 24, 2012

Religiously Motivated Violence Is Terrorism



Religiously Motivated Violence Is Terrorism
by
F. H. Fox




            Creating a single definition for all terrorism is problematic and is a bit like a doctor attempting to cure all ailments of the human body with a single aspirin. While it can be done as a superficial exercise, the overall result is less than ideal. Political Scientists have the same problem as medical doctors. No single definition is adequate to define all aspects of terrorism, nor should it be. Instead, the better solution is to create multiple definitions of terrorism so that each subset of terrorist activity can be defined in useful ways. In this way, better strategies can be created to help curb the violence.             
            With that in mind, this paper addresses and attempts to define one specific subset of terrorism, “Religiously Motivated Violence (RMV).” Obviously, not all violence associated with religion can be described as terrorism, but specific forms of RMV must be considered terrorism. In other words, violence in the name of, and for the sake of religion, is terrorism; however, other forms of violence associated with religion may not be terrorism. Furthermore, in the case of RMV, it does not matter who the violence is directed against because within the RMV perimeters, anyone not part of the religious group may be a justifiable target. For this reason there is no need to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. However, although the qualifier of noncombatants is gone, there are other qualifiers that must be met.
            For example, besides simple or complex violence being employed by the group, there must be a a religiously motivated charismatic leader directing the group to use violence. There are also distinctions between individuals doing violence in the name of religion, and groups doing violence in the name of religion. While this may sound confusing, it can be thought of as stratifications or layers of opportunity that group members may be able to be part of. Furthermore, the violence must be done in the name of religion, and not for some other reason that uses religion as a scapegoat. However, not everyone agrees.           
            Since September 11, 2001, few U.S. federal government policy makers now attempt to analyze terrorism using scientific methods because to do so may limit funding opportunities. Instead, by keeping a more broad and sweeping view of terrorism, Federal government groups are more likely to get funding approved. This was shown after September 11, 2001, when the Bush administration began defining the enemy who attacked the United States of America as a specific group of terrorists seemed like a logical course of action, but then abruptly changed its policy to suddenly lumped the nation’s entire response, "Into a single, undifferentiated enemy undermined efforts to devise an effective strategic strategy."[1] In this situation, undifferentiated meant that for the Bush government, all forms of terrorism were one thing and would be treated the same way. This proved ultimately problematic for several reasons.
            The newly consolidated terrorism definition shifted the needed resources to deal many different groups and individuals collectively identified as terrorists into a single broad and ill-conceived plan of attack that stretched the limited U.S. resources to dangerously low levels. Therefore, it is easy to see how President Bush's conception of the threat then produced a flawed strategic response that continues to plague the U.S. national defense today. As Graham Allison pointed out, "When initial conceptions of the enemy are flawed, the policies that follow will be similarly confused: objectives will be inflated and imprecise, resources will be misallocated, and the scope of the response, both geographically and moral, will be diffused."[2]
            Furthermore, attempting to eradicate terrorism by using one description, again a strategy based on an ill conceived definition, to define what terrorism is, is a lot like producing a “Grand Unification Theory” in particle physics; for example, while physicists seem to have a solid core understanding of how everything works together, as the scale changes to ever more precise measurements, their understanding breaks down and uncertainty prevails.[3] The same thing can then be said of terrorism. For example, while political scientists seem to have an overall understanding of terrorism, like physicists, when pressed for ever more precise definitions of terrorism, political scientists, and just about everyone else, fail to deliver as the scale of investigation becomes increasingly more precise. Consequently, while this short paper cannot hope to attempt to produce a single unified theory of terrorism, it will examine one aspect of terrorism while attempting to answer the question, “When does religious violence become terrorism?”
            First, it is abundantly clear that not all religious violence is terrorism. Throughout history, numerous examples of religious groups doing violent things are not defined using the word terrorism. One primary example that comes to mind is the fifteenth century Mayans. No political scientist today would consider the Mayans people terrorists for a variety of reasons. Mayan violence was state sponsored religiously motivated celebrations that did not attempt to produce political change. Furthermore, Mayan violence was normally directed towards the enemy captured enemy combatants. Lastly, the Mayan violence was part of their shared culture that did not escalate over time in the name of religion.
            In a second example, it is unlikely any nonsectarian group using violence would be associated with religious violence. However, it is likely nonsectarian groups may invoke religion as part of their strategy or to use religious schools and places of worship to enlist individuals to take on the violence. However, that is not the same as a religious group using violence against all others because they see themselves as religiously pure.
            Lastly, as mentioned earlier, the “lone wolf,” with one possible exception that the person is also the charismatic leader, is a person who hears “command directed voices.” Command directed voices are voices only the individual can hear. Some voices are beneficial, like what most people consider their conscious. However, other voices can be so forceful the person feels compelled to follow their instructions. If the commands are benevolent, the person may lead a normal life. However, if the voices promote violence, the person may be directed to ever more violent tendencies and is considered to be psychologically unbalanced. The once exception to this rule may be if that person is part of a religious group, and then uses his voices as a way to orchestrate violence against others by getting the group to follow him as a charismatic leader. Jim Jones would be an example of a charismatic leader that promoted violence. However, it is not known if he heard voices or not.
            So what is religiously based violence? While David Bromley does not specifically answer the question, he does state, "By collective violence I refer to acts committed by individual in the name of some religious movement or the acts committed against religious individuals or movements by agents of social control and legitimated by some organizational purpose."[4] In that way, Bromley’s definition quantifies the violence using the word “collective” makes it clear that any definition of religious terror must use collective action. Additionally, to Bromley, it would seem that it is group behavior that mitigates or propels individuals into action or inaction. In that way, Bromley states leadership is ultimately important, especially when the group has reached its apex of development. Bromley then goes on to say, only when the leader feels he is losing control over the movement’s destiny will he may, “Authorize or guide the use of force.” While this may not be the only way a group moves to violence, it does illustrate the point that any group may end up radicalized, and either harm others, external violence, or themselves, internal violence. Some examples of external violence includes Solar Temple and Aum Shinrikyo, “Whose leaders gave direct orders to initiate violence.” Internal violence that ultimately was directed towards its own membership included Jim Jones’ White Night Drills, and Marshall Applewhite’s Heaven’s Gate. In both the latter cases, members killed themselves and others within the groups.[5]
            The question then becomes whether all religious cults, when their charismatic leaders feel threatened, have the propensity to become violent if they were not first based on violence? Mark Juergensmeyer seems to think so. He pointed out that over half of the thirty of the most dangerous groups listed in 1998 by the U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright were religious. However, Juergensmeyer does not mention any larger study of violent groups, or what those percentages would be. For example, of the top one thousand most dangerous groups, would the same percentages be considered religiously motivated? Even so, Juergensmeyer is correct when he claims most people feel that religion should provide tranquility and peace, and not terror. “Yet in many of these cases, religion supplied not only the ideology, but also the motivation and the organizational structure for the perpetrators."[6] This, Juergensmeyer, points out, points out one of the more problematic issues concerning terrorism, “Whether or not one uses “terrorist” to describe violent acts depends on wether one thinks that the acts are warranted.” For example, Juergensmeyer states the world is at peace and violence occurs, then it might be considered terrorism, but if the world is at war, then the violence would considered legitimate.[7] However, that would obviously depend entirely on the definition of terrorism used. Furthermore, from the point of view of the violent instigator, while the world may consider him a terrorist, he may see himself either as a legitimate soldier, or as a mercenary.  For example, if that violent instigator honestly thought his group at war, then in his mind, his violent actions are justified and legitimate courses of action. However, even if the key point that terrorism is a matter of perception, clear definitions of terrorism continue to be needed because then a strategic plan can be created to better deal with the various kinds of violence.
            Jessica Stern seems to agree, point of view is important. She used the Kalfan Khamis Mohamed bombing at the American Embassy at Tanzania to illustrate the point. Mohamed told the FBI in 1999 that he even though he had been caught, he thought the operation had been a success because since the bomb worked, it sent a message to America and kept American officials preoccupied with the investigation. Furthermore, he stated that if he had not been caught, he would have continued participate in the jihad against America. If released, he vowed to bomb Americans again. However, Mohamed also, “Wanted Americans to understand he and his fellow warriors are not crazy, gun-wielding people, but are fighting for a cause.”[8] In Mohamed’s case, this religiously motivated bombing was choreographed by a large religiously motivated group called Al Qaeda. However, that raises one of the more troubling aspects to discussing the religious ramifications of terrorism, whether the charismatic leadership of groups prone to violence may have one agenda while the people carrying out the acts an entirely different one. For this reason, the question of wether Kalfan Khamis Mohamed was religiously or politically motivated is potentially problematic because Stern fails to adequately demonstrate whether Khamis would have acted the same with just a religious goal in mind.
            Even so, from Mohamed’s we can see there seems to be four levels of hierarchy, but only the lowest of the tier, those who are not even official Al Qaeda members that provide the fodder for suicide missions.[9] That would seem to establish, at least of Al Qaeda, that the people blowing themselves up, because they are not full members, may not agree with the Al Qaeda leadership. If so, that may also indicate the suicide bombers are either more or less religiously and politically motivated then their leadership. More so, demonstrates they are more devoted to their religion than the leadership. In that case, religion is simply a means to an end for the leadership. However, if suicide bombers are really either more or less devoted to religion than the Al Qaeda leaders, then the reverse may be true. Only by making thorough studies of individual groups may an answer be found, but only for that one group because every group is different.
            While this much is clear, that there are all types of groups that use religious ideas as part of their version of terrorism, what not everyone agrees on is how important the role of religion is and how it is used in violence and terrorist activities. Worse yet, attempting to declare what constitutes a religion may be equally problematic. For example, William T. Cavanaugh indicates that Western nations cannot afford to allow religion to gain power in the Middle East because the changing dichotomy could potentially be problematic for national security. Specifically, he wrote, “I would make clear what groups might be declared religious but are in fact not.”
           
Religion-and-violence arguments serve a particular need for their consumers in the West. These arguments are part of a broader Enlightenment narrative that has invented a dichotomy between the religious and the secular and constructed the former as an irrational and dangerous impulse that must give way in public to rational, secular forms of power. In the West, revulsion toward killing and dying in the name of one's religion is one of the principal means by which we become convinced that killing and dying in the name of the nation-state is laudable and proper. The myth of the religious violence also provides secular social orders with a stock character, the religious fanatic, to serve as enemy.[10]

In other words, Cavanaugh claims because secular nations cannot directly use religion as a way to motivate its people, but instead must uses religion to motivate indirectly, as a kind of mirror to convince its people that it is perfectly acceptable to die either for one’s country or die for one’s religion. While some may claim there seems to be a problem with using violence and terrorism interchangeably, and that Religion might justify or not the killing of civilians, in the end, if my definition is correct, in that religious violence really is terrorism, then any killing outside of the religious sect is justified by the group.
            So who is right? Are people motivated by religion to commit violent acts on the orders of charismatic leaders who feel they are loosing control over the direction their group is taking, or are religiously motivated people naturally drawn to people who have violent tendencies? While this may make it sound like religion creates violence, the only way to decide for sure is to continue examining ideas that will lead to a specific definition for religious terrorism. In doing so, we must now attempt to find a reasonable definition of religious violence.
            By comparing Pape and Abrahms and Tilly, it seems likely that likely answer must be somewhere between all the extremes. For example, while Pape and Abrahms argue about rational and social ideas along with conceptions of terrorism motivation, others like Tilly, Gurr, and Stern argue for different ideas why some people may be prone to either be violent, or be willing to join violent groups.[11] While this may make it easy to expand this paper to include ever widening areas of thought for clarity, for the purposes of brevity, they must be excluded. Instead, I shall make use of their ideas along with the works already sited to make the case to clarify my own definition of religious terror.
            First, as Cavanaugh stated, it may in the interest of the West to convince its own people that religiously motivated terror and violence is the normal outcome of religious extremists and even fundamentalism because then it may be easier to get people to fight for the sovereignty of the nation. So even though the sovereignty is not really at risk, fear of death is the real problem. If so, then the created definition used for religious violence must be very specific, so as not to become a political motivator for all other religious organizations. However, in doing so, we also must also not forget that some religious leaders become violent over time, and while they begin as benevolent leaders, may later direct their followers towards a path of violence. This may be true even though when the group was created, there was no violent tendencies. Second, when formulating the definition, we must consider that the leaders directing the violence may have a different agenda than the people doing the violence, or vice versa. That means there may often be a multidimensional aspect to consider for each tier of any violent religious group.
            So now, having been given several important ideas what religious terrorism is, it is now possible to provide a specific definition for Religiously Motivated Violence (RMV). For example, the overall definition must first include the idea of collectivism. Furthermore, the definition must include charismatic leadership. Additionally, the religious group must want some kind of change. Lastly, the definition of RMV may not be a secular movement. So for the sake of argument, my definition of RMV is the following: “Religious Motivated Violence RMV is considered terrorism when the violent act is made by any collective religious group, designed to change the status quo for either the individual members or for others. The religious group must be led by a charismatic leader, and that person must be religiously motivated. Lastly, RMV must use violence and it does not matter who the intended targets were, combatants or noncombatants. As stated earlier, unlike many other definitions of terrorism, there is no reason to differentiate between combatants and noncombatants as the targets of the intended violence of religious groups because in any true RMV, any person outside the religious group is a potential target.
            In conclusion, attempting to create a single definition for all terrorism is folly for many reasons. However, by examining every aspect of terrorism in a concrete and scientific ways, by creating subcategories and genus, and then beginning with very specific definitions for each group, subgroup, and type or kind of terrorism, we may then find effective answers to the overall problem of terrorism. In that way, we may also find ways to eradicate violence associated with all terroristic groups. However, as noted, the one major drawback to using scientific investigational techniques is that there will never be a simple, all encompassing definition for every form of terrorism. Instead, multiple definitions of terrorism must be produced to deal with each kind of terrorism, and even for every level within each terrorist organization. Consequently, that means terrorism cannot be diagnosed or fought using any single technique, tool, or method, anymore than doctors can fight multiple ailments with a single aspirin. However, by producing very specific definitions, better ways and strategies may be found to eliminate much of the associated violence.










Bibliography:
Abrahams, Max, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism             Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, Spring 2008. Cavanaugh, William T. The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of             Modern Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
 Gottlieb, Stuart, ed. Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on             Causes, Contexts, and Responses, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010.


Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence,             Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.

Lewis, James R., ed. Violence and New Religious Movements, Oxford: Oxford University Press,             2011.

Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review,             Vol. 97, No. 3, Aug 2003.

Randall, Lisa, Knocking on Heaven’s Door, New York: Collins, 2011.

Stern, Jessica. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, New York:             Harpers-Collins, 2003.

Tilly, Charles, and Tarrow, S., Contentious Politics, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007.






[1] Stuart Gottlieb ed. Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010), page x.
[2] Stuart Gottlieb ed., Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses, page xi.
[3] Lisa Randall, Knocking on Heaven’s Door, (New York, Collins, 2011), pages xii-xxii.
[4] James R. Lewis, ed. Violence and New Religious Movements, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), page 27.
[5] James R. Lewis, ed. Violence and New Religious Movements, pages 24-25.
[6] Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pages 5-6.
[7] Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pages 8-9.
[8] Stern, Jessica. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, (New York: Harpers-Collins, 2003), pages 244-245.
[9] Stern, Jessica. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, (New York: Harpers-Collins, 2003), page 249.
[10] William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pages 4-5.
[11] Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3, Aug 2003. pp. 343-361, and Max Abrahams, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), pp. 78–105, and Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics, (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers), pp. 45-66.

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