by
F. H. Fox
Attempting to create a single definition
for terrorism is a bit like a doctor saying all ailments of the human body are
caused by the same thing, and as such, the human body should always be treated
for those ailments in the same way. Instead, I propose that there should be
multiple definitions of terrorism because terrorism can then be diagnosed and
fought using vastly different techniques. To do so would be beneficial for all
humankind. Therefor, I will discuss and create a definition what is perhaps the
largest area of collective terrorism, religiously motivated groups using
violence to change the status quo.
After September 11, 2001, the Bush
administration’s decision to define the enemy who attacked the United States of
America as a specific group of terrorists seemed like a logical course of
action, but then the Bush government abruptly changed its policy and suddenly
lumped the nation’s entire response, "Into a single, undifferentiated
enemy undermined efforts to devise an effective strategic strategy."[1]
This proved ultimately problematic because it shifted the needed resources to
deal many different groups and individuals collectively identified as
terrorists. With the limited U.S. resources stretched to dangerously low
levels, President Bush's conception of the threat produced a flawed strategic
response that continues to plague the national defense of the United States of
America today. Therefore, as Graham Allison pointed out, "When initial
conceptions of the enemy are flawed, the policies that follow will be similarly
confused: objectives will be inflated and imprecise, resources will be
misallocated, and the scope of the response, both geographically and moral,
will be diffused."[2]
Furthermore,
attempting to eradicate terrorism by using one description to define what
terrorism is, is a lot like producing a “Grand Unification Theory” in particle
physics; for example, while physicists seem to have a solid core understanding
of how everything works together, as the scale changes to ever more precise
measurements, their understanding breaks down and uncertainty prevails.[3]
The same thing can then be said of terrorism. For example, while political
scientists seem to have an overall understanding of terrorism, like physicists,
when pressed for ever more precise definitions of terrorism, political
scientists fail to deliver as the scale of investigation becomes increasingly
more precise. Consequently, while this short paper cannot hope to attempt to
produce a single unified theory of terrorism, it will examine one aspect of
terrorism while attempting to answer the question, “When does religious
violence become terrorism?”
First,
it is abundantly clear that not all religious violence is terrorism. Throughout
history, numerous examples of religious groups doing violent things are not
defined using the word terrorism. One primary example that comes to mind is the
fifteenth century Mayans. No political scientist today would consider the
Mayans people terrorists for a variety of reasons. It was state sponsored, it
did not attempt to produce change, and the Mayan violence was normally directed
towards the enemy who they captured. In a second example, it is unlikely a
nonsectarian group using violence would be associated with religious violence.
Lastly, the “lone wolf,” with one possible exception that will be discussed later, is a person who
hears command directed voices, even if he is part of a religious group, is
generally not considered a terrorist.
So
what is religiously based violence? While David Bromley does not specifically
address the question, he does state, "By collective violence I refer to
acts committed by individual in the name of some religious movement or the acts
committed against religious individuals or movements by agents of social
control and legitimated by some organizational purpose."[4]
In that way, Bromley’s definition quantifies the violence using the word
“collective” makes it clear that any definition of religious terror must have
collective action. Additionally, to Bromley, it would seem that it is group
behavior that mitigates or propels individuals into action or inaction. In that
way, Bromley states leadership is ultimately important, especially when the
group has reached its apex of development. Only when the leader feels he is
losing control over the movement’s destiny will he, “Authorize or guide the use
of force.” At this point, the group may be considered radicalized, and either
harm others or themselves. Examples of external violence includes Solar Temple
and Aum Shinrikyo, “Whose leaders gave direct orders to initiate violence.”
Internal violence that ultimately was directed towards its own membership
included Jim Jones’ White Night Drills,
and Marshall Applewhite’s Heaven’s Gate.
In both cases, members killed themselves and in some cases, each other.[5]
The
question then becomes whether all religious cults, when their charismatic
leaders feel threatened, have the propensity to become violent? Mark
Juergensmeyer seems to think so. He stated that of the thirty most dangerous
groups listed in 1998 by the U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, over
half were religious. However, he then fails to point out many of the thirty
violent groups were not religious. Furthermore, Juergensmeyer does not mention
any larger study of violent groups, or what those percentages would be. For
example, of the top one thousand most dangerous groups, how many would be
considered religiously motivated? Even so, Juergensmeyer is correct when he
claimed most people feel that religion should provide tranquility and peace,
not terror. “Yet in many of these cases, religion supplied not only the
ideology, but also the motivation and the organizational structure for the
perpetrators."[6]
However Juergensmeyer also points out one of the more problematic issues
concerning terrorism, “Whether or not one uses “terrorist” to describe violent
acts depends on wether one thinks that the acts are warranted.” For example, if
the world is at peace and violence occurs, then it might be considered
terrorism, but if the world is at war then the violence would considered
legitimate.[7]
However, from the point of view of the violent instigator, while the world may
consider him a terrorist, he may see himself as a soldier if he thought his
group at war. If so, then in his mind, his violent actions become justified and
legitimate courses of action.
Jessica
Stern seems to agree. She used the Kalfan Khamis Mohamed bombing at the
American Embassy at Tanzania to illustrate the point. Mohamed told the FBI in
1999 that he even though he had been caught, he thought the operation had been
a success because since the bomb worked, it sent a message to America and kept
American officials preoccupied with the investigation. Furthermore, he stated
that if he had not been caught, he would have continued participate in the
jihad against America. If released, he vowed to bomb Americans again. However,
Mohamed also, “Wanted Americans to understand he and his fellow warriors are
not crazy, gun-wielding people, but are fighting for a cause.”[8]
In Mohamed’s case, this religiously motivated bombing was choreographed by a
large religiously motivated group called Al Qaeda. However, that raises one of
the more troubling aspects to discussing the religious ramifications of
terrorism, whether the charismatic leadership of groups prone to violence may
have one agenda while the people carrying out the acts an entirely different
one.
From
Mohamed’s trial we can see there seems to be four levels of hierarchy, but only
the lowest of the tier, those who are not even official Al Qaeda members that
provide the fodder for suicide missions.[9] That would
seem to establish, at least of Al Qaeda, that the people blowing themselves up,
because they are not full members, may not agree with their leadership. If so,
that may also indicate the suicide bombers are either more or less religiously
and politically motivated then their leadership. More so, demonstrates they are
more devoted to their religion than the leadership. In that case, religion is
simply a means to an end for the leadership. However, if suicide bomber are
really less devoted to religion than their leaders, then the opposite may be
true. Only by making thorough studies of individual groups may an answer be
found, but only for that one group because every group is different.
However,
not everyone agrees that religion even plays an important role in violence and
terrorist activities. Worse yet, attempting to declare what constitutes a
religion may be equally problematic. For example, William T. Cavanaugh
indicates that Western nations cannot afford to allow religion to gain power
because the changing dichotomy could potentially be problematic for national
security. Specifically, he wrote:
Religion-and-violence
arguments serve a particular need for their consumers in the West. These
arguments are part of a broader Enlightenment narrative that has invented a dichotomy between the religious and the secular
and constructed the former as an irrational and
dangerous impulse that must give way in public to rational, secular forms of
power. In the West, revulsion toward killing and dying in the name of one's
religion is one of the principal means by which we become convinced that
killing and dying in the name of the nation-state
is laudable and proper. The myth of the religious violence also provides
secular social orders with a stock
character, the religious fanatic, to serve as enemy.[10]
In other words, Cavanaugh claims because
secular nations cannot directly use religion as a way to motivate its people,
but instead must uses religion to motivate indirectly, as a kind of mirror to
convince its people that it is perfectly acceptable to die either for one’s
country or die for one’s religion.
So
who is right? Are people motivated by religion to commit violent acts on the
orders of charismatic leaders who feel they are loosing control over the
direction their group is taking, or are religiously motivated people naturally
drawn to people who have violent tendencies? The only way to decide is to
continue examining ideas that will lead to a specific definition for religious
terrorism. In doing so, we must now attempt to find a reasonable definition of
religious violence?
By
comparing Pape and Abrahms and Tilly, it seems likely that likely answer must
be somewhere between all the extremes. For example, while Pape and Abrahms
argue about rational and social ideas, others like Tilly, Gurr, and Stern argue
for different ideas why some people may be prone to either be violent, or be
willing to join violent groups. While this may make it easy to expand this
paper to include ever widening areas of thought for clarity, for the purposes
of brevity, they must be excluded. Instead, I shall make use of their ideas
along with the works already sited to make the case for my own definition of
religious terror.
First,
as Cavanaugh stated it may in the interest of the West to convince its own
people that religiously motivated terror and violence is the normal outcome of
religious extremists and even fundamentalism because then it may be easier to
get people to fight for the sovereignty of the nation. If that is so, then the
created definition used for religious violence must be very specific, so as not
to become a political motivator against all religious organizations, especially
towards newly formed cults that have no violent tendencies. However, in doing
so, we also must not forget that some religious leaders become violent, and may
later direct their followers towards a path of violence later, even when in the
beginning, there was no violent tendencies in the group. Second, when
formulating the definition, we must remember the leaders directing the violence
may not always agree with the people doing the violence, or vice versa. That
means there may be the need to have a multipart definition to consider each
tier of the violent religious group.
So
now, having been given several important ideas what religious terrorism is, it
should be possible to come up with a specific definition what religious
terrorism is, and then compare it to existing debates. The definition must
first include the idea of collectivism. As mentioned earlier, there is a “Lone
Wolf” terrorist that must be identified for this definition. It is only when a
“Lone Wolf” has gained control over a religious group through charismatic
leadership, often telling his group that he communicates directly with God,
that the “Lone Wolf” can then use his status to direct the religious group
toward violent ends. So that means besides collectivism, the definition of
religious terrorism must include charismatic leadership. Additionally, the
religious group must want change. From the Mayan example, we saw that the Mayan
leadership was more interested in keeping the status quo than changing the
climate or government in any way. Lastly, we examined the use of religion
itself by saying the definition of religious terrorism may not be a secular
movement.
So
for the sake of argument, my definition of religious terrorism is the
following, “Religious Terrorism is any violent act made by any collective
religious group designed to change the status quo for either the members
themselves, or others. The religious group must be led a charismatic leader,
and that person must be religiously motivated. Lastly, religious terrorism must
use violence to help create that change of status quo regardless of who the
intended targets were. Unlike many other definitions of terrorism, I see no
reason to differentiate between combatants and noncombatants as the targets of
the intended violence of religious groups because in many cases, the religious
person instigating the violence makes no differentiation.
So
now, let us examine one specific religion, and see if my definition holds up
under scrutiny by analyzing the following debate, “Does Islam play a unique
role in modern religious terrorism?”[11] McCarthy
thinks it does, while Gerges disagrees. McCarthy claims visions of violence
permeates the Western world from Muslims. He wrote the Islam provided the
spiritual motivation for violent jihads, or religious wars. He also states this is not well
understood by the West and claims this violent movement has been growing in
strength for centuries. Using just those first few ideas, it would seem that
McCarthy would not support my definition because, as he argues, the violence
has been going on for centuries. If true, that means there can be no single
charismatic leader who has led Islam for such long time, seemingly invalidating
my definition of “Religious Terrorism.”[12] However,
Gerges disagrees and states Islam is not to blame. He claims moderation and
tolerance already predominates the world wide Muslim communities. Instead, he
points out it is the very nature of Islam that creates the problem and claims
it is only a very small minority of Muslims who condone or engage in violence.
In turn, Gerges would seem to validate my argument that it takes a charismatic
leader to motivate his people to violence in the attempt to produce a
religiously motivated outcome through violent acts and that Islam itself cannot
be considered “Religious Terrorism” any more than Christianity can be blamed
for its brand of terror throughout the Columbian Exchange or the Protestant
Reformation. Only individual leaders using religion as a method to motivate
followers to violence can be considered candidates for religious terrorism.[13]
In
conclusion, attempting to create a single definition for all terrorism is
folly. Only by examining every aspect of terrorism in a concrete and scientific
way can we hope to finally eradicate violence associated with all groups.
However, to do so means multiple definitions of terrorism must be produced to
deal with each kind of terrorism. Terrorism itself cannot be diagnosed or
fought using singe techniques anymore than doctors can fight individual
ailments in the human body with a single aspirin. Only by producing specific
definitions for each kind of terrorism can we possibly hope to rid humankind of
its’ plight.
[1]
Stuart Gottlieb ed. Debating Terrorism
and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and
Responses, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010), page x.
[2]
Stuart Gottlieb ed., Debating Terrorism
and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and
Responses, page xi.
[4]
James R. Lewis, ed. Violence and New
Religious Movements, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), page 27.
[6]
Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind
of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2000), pages 5-6.
[7]
Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind
of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2000), pages 8-9.
[8]
Stern, Jessica. Terror in the Name of
God: Why Religious Militants Kill, (New York: Harpers-Collins, 2003), pages
244-245.
[9]
Stern, Jessica. Terror in the Name of
God: Why Religious Militants Kill, (New York: Harpers-Collins, 2003), page
249.
[10]
Cavanaugh, William T. The Myth of
Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pages 4-5.
[11]
Stuart Gottlieb, ed. Debating Terrorism
and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and
Responses. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010), pages 101-102.
[12]
Stuart
Gottlieb, ed. Debating Terrorism and
Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses.
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010),
pages 105-115.
[13]
Stuart
Gottlieb, ed. Debating Terrorism and
Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses, pages 115 - 130.
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